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Since the early 1980s experimental methods have added new insights to complement 
the theoretical models intended to explain asset pricing and, in particular, stylized facts such 
as bubbles and crashes. Many of these factors are institutional, such as the ability to sell short 
or the specific market process used. Some others are directly related to market parameters 
such as cash and asset endowments or fundamental value time paths. However, the 
characteristics of individual traders are another factor that plays an important role in 
aggregate market behavior. In the first three chapters of this thesis we focus on some of these 
dimensions, and using experimental methodology and innovative software, we discover 
behavioral patterns that explain to some extent these phenomena. Other behavioral biases are 
analyzed in the fourth chapter regarding investment decision making in the framing of mutual 
funds.  
The structure of the fundamental value time path of an asset is one variable that is 
demonstrated to determine the extent to which asset prices track fundamentals. In the first 
chapter of this thesis, we construct an asset market experiment in order to investigate how the 
time path of the fundamental value trajectory affects the level of adherence to fundamentals. 
In contrast to previous experiments with long-lived assets, in this experiment there is a phase 
in which fundamental values are constant before the onset of a trend, which is either 
increasing or decreasing, depending on the treatment. We compare the level of mispricing 
between the two treatments and we find that there is closer adherence to fundamental values 
when they follow a decreasing than when they have an increasing trend. Before the 
experiment begins, risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive reflection protocols were 
administered to traders. We find a number of patterns relating trader’s characteristics with 
market behavior. One is that greater average risk aversion on the part of traders in the market 
predicts lower market prices and the greater the level of loss aversion, the lower the quantity 
traded. A higher average on the cognitive reflection test score correlates with less deviation 
from the fundamentals. The variation between groups in risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT 
score explains 45% of the variation in price level and in mispricing relative to fundamental 
between trader cohorts. 
In the second chapter of this thesis we analyze the relationship between bubbles and 
crashes in an asset market and the emotions of traders. Previous work has shown that the 
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magnitude of bubbles is sensitive to environmental parameters such as the amount of liquidity 
available, institutional factors such as the ability to sell short and the trading institution, and 
the time path of fundamentals. Nonetheless, there is considerable variation within all 
conditions that is unexplained. That is, some sessions generate larger bubbles than others 
despite identical economic structure. We consider here whether variation in the emotional 
state of participants between different cohorts can account for some of this heterogeneity. To 
do so, we create an experimental asset market with the structure first studied by Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams (1988), which is known to generate price bubbles and crashes. 
Participants' facial expressions are analyzed with facereading software before and while the 
market is operating. The main finding is that greater positive emotion in facial expressions 
before the market opens predicts higher prices and larger bubbles. Greater fear predicts lower 
prices and smaller bubbles. Those traders who remain the most neutral during periods of 
market volatility achieve the highest earnings. Loss aversion in decision making is correlated 
with fear, but not with other emotions.  
In light of the results obtained in the second chapter, we go one step further in the third 
chapter and analyze the dynamic relationship between emotions and market activity, at both 
the individual and market levels, in nearly real time. For this purpose we use a tick-by-tick 
dataset that matches individuals’ trading activity with their emotional state throughout the 
market horizon. The individual analysis, in particular, allows us to gain a better 
understanding of the interaction between emotions, market variables and individual 
decision making. We document the feedback process, consisting of the effect of 
individuals’ emotions on their behavior, the resulting impact on market-level variables and 
individuals’ wealth, and in turn, the influence of market activity on the emotional state of 
traders. We find that positive emotional state enhances purchases and therefore overpricing. 
Also more emotions in general create more activity in a market, in particular more bids. 
These facts contribute to the creation of bubbles, which are sustained by approach emotions 
such as anger and happiness. As fear appears in the market, a crash becomes more likely to 
occur.  
The last chapter of the thesis is focused on behavioral biases in mutual fund 
investment. There is an important branch of experimental literature that analyzes investor 
behavior, and in most cases unpredicted behavior appears, to a great extent related to the 
information available to the investors or to the framing of that information. These articles 
show that individual investors at times make suboptimal asset allocation decisions. We 
present a study that proposes a simple experimental design, which allows for an analysis of 
individual investor behavior in structured mutual funds according to variables such as 
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expected return and risk (we vary the former while keeping the latter constant). At the same 
time, the protocol tries to eliminate possible behavioral biases such as the effect of past 
performance, of the disclosure of the probability distribution of the potential gains/losses, and 
of other features that might complicate comparisons: fees, non-portfolio services, etc. This 
approach also allows us to evaluate the effect that the structure of the available information 
has on investor behavior and, consequently, on the demand for the funds. The results show 
that when the investment alternatives are made easier to compare by showing the funds in 























Fundamental value trajectories and trader characteristics in 




 The tendency for experimental markets for long-lived assets to price at levels that 
differ from intrinsic values is one of the most robust and puzzling results from research in 
experimental markets. This result, first established by Smith et al. (1988), has been replicated 
in numerous studies, though the extent and pattern of mispricing is affected by a number of 
factors. These include the levels of endowment of shares and cash available for transactions 
(Caginalp et al., 1998; 2000), the trading institutions employed (Lugovskyy et al., 2012), the 
training of subjects (Lei and Vesely, 2009), and the induction of emotions (Andrade et al, 
2012; Lahav and Meer, 2010). See Palan (2013) for an overview of this research. 
 One factor that has long been suspected as a source of mispricing in the Smith et al. 
(1988) experiment is the declining time path of the fundamental value. Because the asset is 
finitely-lived, and pays a dividend in each period, the intrinsic value, which equals the 
expected sum of future dividends, declines after each dividend has been paid. Some authors 
have claimed that this declining fundamental value structure is unfamiliar to experimental 
subjects, who are typically used to appreciating assets outside the laboratory (Noussair et al., 
2001; Kirchler et al., 2012). The claim is that the declining fundamental value serves as a 
source of confusion for subjects. Indeed, it does appear that subject misunderstanding plays a 
role in generating mispricing in such an environment (Lei et al., 2001; Lei and Vesely, 2009; 
Kirchler et al., 2012; Cheung et al., 2013).  
 There is evidence that the time path of fundamentals can affect the extent to which 
prices track fundamentals. Noussair et al. (2001) compare markets in which the fundamental 
value is constant over time to ones in which it is decreasing. They find that the setting with 
constant fundamentals generates less mispricing. Giusti et al. (2012) compare settings in 
which fundamentals are increasing versus decreasing. In their setting, the cash held by traders 
7 
 
earns interest, and with a sufficiently high interest rate, the fundamental value of the asset 
increases over time. They observe a strong pattern; fundamental value trajectories with an 
increasing trend are more conducive to pricing close to fundamentals than those that are 
decreasing. Huber al., (2012) implement decreasing fundamental value trajectories with 
dividend payments, and increasing time paths by imposing taxes (in effect negative 
dividends), on those who hold units at the end of each period. They observe that a decreasing 
trend leads to overpricing and an increasing trend to underpricing, though the increasing 
trajectory departs to a lesser extent from fundamental pricing. Both treatments exhibit a rapid 
adjustment of prices in the direction of the fundamental near the end of the life of the asset.     
 The most closely related study to the one reported here is that of Noussair and Powell 
(2010). They study two treatments, called Peak and Valley. The treatments differ from each 
other in only one aspect. In Peak, the fundamental value of the asset increases for first eight 
periods of the 15-period horizon, and then declines for the remaining seven. Under Valley, 
the value declines for the first eight periods and then increases for seven. There is a strong 
difference in the speed and extent of price discovery between the two treatments. Prices 
adhere to fundamentals much more closely in the Peak than in the Valley treatment. When the 
early and late periods of the asset’s time horizon are considered separately, the decreasing 
trajectory exhibits better price discovery when it follows a phase of increase than when it 
precedes it. In contrast, prices under the increasing trajectory track fundamentals more closely 
when it constitutes the first phase of the time path rather than the second.
1
 
 The above discussion suggests that the timing of the onset of a fundamental trend and 
the time path of intrinsic value preceding the beginning of the trend might be a crucial factor 
influencing price discovery. A phase of trading before the onset of a trend allows a 
redistribution of units and cash among traders, as well as the accumulation of experience. 
Thus, the trend in fundamentals begins under different conditions than it would if were to set 
in immediately. In this chapter, we report the results of a new experiment that is designed to 
consider the relationship between the time path of fundamental value and the price discovery 
process under such conditions. The experiment has two treatments. In the Bullmarket 
treatment, the time path is constant for the first half of the life of the asset, after which there is 
an increasing trend in fundamental value for the remainder of the life of the asset. In the 
Bearmarket treatment, the phase of constant fundamentals is instead followed by a decreasing 
trend in the second half of the asset’s life. We find that the Bearmarket treatment exhibits 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that in all of the previous experimental studies mentioned in this introduction, 
subjects know what the fundamental value of the asset would be at each time period in the future. Thus, 
fundamental value trends are always accurately anticipated in advance. In the study we conduct here, 
we continue with this practice. 
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closer adherence to fundamental value than the Bullmarket treatment. Thus, the addition of 
the initial phase with constant fundamentals before the onset of the trend induces a reversal of 
the results of Giusti et al (2012) and Huber et al. (2012), who observe that price discovery is 
better for increasing trends. 
 In our experiment, before subjects participate in the asset market, they complete three 
individual choice tasks. These are described in detail in section 2.2. First, participants’ loss 
aversion is measured with a version of the protocol used in Fehr and Goette (2007). Second, 
the willingness/ability to reflect about their decisions is elicited with a cognitive reflection 
test (CRT) as described in Frederick (2005). Third, risk aversion is measured with the 
procedure of Holt and Laury (2002). The data from these tasks permit us to consider the link 
between risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive ability on one hand, and market behavior 
and individual trading strategies on the other. 
 As described in section two, we advance a number of hypotheses about the 
relationship between loss aversion, risk aversion, cognitive reflection, and market behavior. 
In particular, we hypothesize that the average risk aversion of participants in a market is 
correlated with the average price level, with more risk aversion associated with lower prices. 
We also hypothesize that the average level of loss aversion of market participants is 
predictive of the quantity traded, with more loss aversion correlating with lower transaction 
volume. The last hypothesis is that greater average CRT score among the trader cohort 
predicts lower mispricing relative to fundamental value. As described in section four, all three 
of these hypotheses are supported, at least to some extent. Furthermore, we observe 
correlations between the responses on these measurement protocols and trading strategies. 
Risk-averse agents are less likely to trade based on market momentum, and loss-averse agents 
are less likely to speculate. Those scoring more highly on the cognitive reflection test are 
more likely to behave as fundamental value traders. Thus, intuitive relationships exist 




2. The Experiment 
2.1. General structure 
  
 The experiment consisted of sixteen experimental sessions. Twelve of these sessions 
were conducted at the CentER laboratory at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The other 
four took place at the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE) facility at the University 
of Jaume I, Castellon, Spain. The sessions at Tilburg were conducted in English and those in 
Castellon were in Spanish. The English version of the instructions can be found in the 
Appendix. All participants were students enrolled at one of the two universities. Between 7 
and 9 individuals participated in each session. Each session consisted of four parts and took 
on average approximately two hours. Average earnings were 22.64 Euro. 
 
2.2. Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion, and Cognitive Reflection Measures    
  
 Each session consisted of four parts. The first part was the administration of a 
protocol to measure loss aversion. We employed a version of the elicitation procedure used 
by Fehr and Goette (2007), which is a series of six choices, presented in a price list format. 
Subjects completed the task using a pen and paper. The choices were presented on one sheet 
of paper. This meant that subjects could revise their earlier decisions in light of their choices 
in subsequent ones.  
 
Each task required the person to indicate whether she would like to play a gamble 
which yielded a gain of 4.5 Euro with probability .5 or a loss of an amount x with probability 
.5. Depending on the decision task, x took on values of {.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, and 5.5 Euros}. 
Each value of x appeared in exactly one decision task that each subject completed. Subjects 
submitted all of their choices simultaneously when they turned in their sheet of paper to the 
experimenter. Only one of the decisions counted toward their earnings. The decision task this 
would be was determined after all decisions were turned in. A die was rolled, determining 
which decision would count for each participant. If a subject had chosen not to play the 
relevant gamble, she received a payoff of zero for part I of the experiment. If a participant 
chose to accept the selected gamble, a coin was flipped to determine whether she received 4.5 
Euro or the negative payment specified in the gamble. A separate coin was flipped for each 
participant who chose the gamble. We used the number of gambles one was not willing to 
accept as a measure of her loss aversion.     
Parts two, three, and four of the experiment were computerized. In the second part of 
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the experiment all subjects completed the cognitive reflection test developed by Frederick 
(2005). Subjects were given three minutes to answer three questions, and they received 1 
Euro for each correct answer. The three questions were: 
1. A bat and a ball cost a total of 1.10 Euro. The bat costs 1 Euro more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? 
2. If it takes five people five minutes to make five widgets, how long does it take 
100 people to make 100 widgets? 
3. In the lake there is a patch of lily pads, which doubles in size every day. It takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake. How many days does it take the 
patch to cover half of the lake? 
 This test has been used extensively in experimental economics to measure the ability 
(or willingness, depending on the researcher’s interpretation of the test) to reflect in 
answering a question. Akiyama et al (2013), when investigating the mispricing in an 
experimental asset market, find that the effect of strategic uncertainty on trading decisions is 
greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it is not 
significant for those with low scores. Corgnet et al. (2013) find that subjects with lower CRT 
scores tend to trade at prices that can result in losses. 
 
The questions have the feature that the first answer that typically springs to mind is 
an incorrect one, but that the correct answer is simple upon some reflection. We took the 
number of correct answers as a measure of how prepared an individual is to reflect about a 
decision situation. 
 
In part three, subjects’ risk aversion levels were measured using the Holt-Laury 
(2002) protocol. Under this procedure, subjects make a series of 10 choices between a 
relatively low-variance, and a relatively high-variance, lottery. The choices follow a price list 
format, in which the high-variance lottery takes on an ever greater expected value relative to 
the low-variance lottery. The probability at which the individual becomes willing to accept 
the riskier lottery implies a level of risk aversion. Specifically, there is a series of ten choices 
between two lotteries of the form (p, x1; 1-p, x2) and (p, y1; 1–p, y2) where y2 > x2 > x1 > y1, 
and p varies monotonically from .1 to 1 in increments of .1 in the ten different choices. In our 
experiment, we set y2 = 3.85, x2 = 2.00, x1 = 1.60, and y1 = 0.10, denominated in Euro. Thus, a 
person choosing the relatively low-variance lottery (p, x1; 1-p, x2) for p ≤ .4, and the high-
variance lottery (p, y1; 1–p, y2) for p > .4, was consistent with risk neutrality, the 
maximization of expected value. Fewer (more) than four safe choices are consistent with risk-
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seeking (risk-averse) preferences. The ten decisions were presented on one screen, so that 
individuals could revisit and revise their responses to previous questions in light of latter 
ones. When they were satisfied that they did not want to change any of their responses, they 
submitted all ten of them simultaneously.
2
  One of the 10 questions was randomly selected to 
count toward earnings. 
2.3 The Market and the Two Treatments 
 The fourth phase of the experiment was the most lengthy and consisted of a sequence 
of two asset markets, both identical in parametric structure. Each market consisted of 15 
periods, during which individuals could trade units of an asset. The asset’s lifetime equaled 
the 15 periods during which the market was in operation. An experimental currency called 
ECU, converted to Euros at the end of the experiment, was used for all payments, 
transactions, taxes and dividend distributions. After the first 15- period market had elapsed, a 
second market was conducted. The second market was reinitialized to conditions identical to 
those prevailing at the beginning of the first market. Thus the first and second markets began 
under identical conditions except for the level of experience of traders. 
 
 There were two treatments, called BearMarket and BullMarket. The BearMarket 
treatment was characterized by a time path of fundamentals that was constant during the early 
portion of each market and decreasing during the latter portion. The decreasing trend began in 
period 8 of each market. The BullMarket treatment consisted of markets in which the 
fundamental value was constant in the early periods of the market, and increasing beginning 
in period 8. The time path of fundamentals in the two treatments is illustrated in Figures 1a 
and 1b. In the figures, the horizontal axis indicates the period number. The vertical axis 
indicates the fundamental value, in terms of ECU, the experimental currency. Subjects knew 
at all times what the fundamental value would be in all future periods, and thus the change in 





                                                          
2
 Only 5% of the participants made inconsistent choices, that is to say, they chose the safe lottery, 
then switched to the risky lottery, and finally chose the safe option again in the choice list. For these 
subjects the risk aversion measurement was the number of safe choices they made in total, 
regardless the switching point.  
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Figure 1: Fundamental Value Time Paths, Both Treatments 
 
 
The fundamental value of the asset arose from three sources: dividends, 
taxes/subsidies, and a final buyout. This final buyout was a payment for each unit of asset 
held at the end of the market, that is, at the end of period 15, to the unit’s owner. All three 
components of fundamental value were in effect payments to or by the current owners of the 
asset on each unit they held. Because the asset is finitely lived, at any point in time the 
fundamental value was the sum of the expected net future financial flows from all three 
sources. Specifically, the fundamental value of a unit of the asset during any period was equal 
to the sum of the expected dividends and final buyout it would generate, minus any taxes and 
plus any subsidies that remained to be paid on the unit. Thus, the fundamental value of one 
unit of the asset at any point in time was the expected value of the stream of payments that 
resulted from holding the unit for the remainder of the current market. The three different 
sources of value were included in the design merely to induce the appropriate dynamic 
patterns in fundamental values. All three components were present in both treatments so that 
both conditions had the same level of complexity. The number and timing of future dividend 
draws, tax payments, and final buyouts in the current market was always common knowledge. 
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After every period, each unit of the asset paid a dividend to its current owner. 
Dividends were drawn independently for each period from a two-point distribution with equal 
probability of +10 or -10. In the experiment, the dividends were determined with a public 
coin flip. The result of the coin flip was then entered into the computer by the experimenter.  
The expected dividend in any period, and thus the expected future dividend stream, was equal 
to 0 ECU. 
 
In periods 8 – 15 of each market in the BullMarket treatment, taxes were paid. After 
each of these periods, all subjects paid a fixed inventory tax of 10 ECU for each unit in their 
possession. The effect of these taxes was to create an increasing fundamental value trend 
during the periods that the tax was in effect. Each tax payment reduced the future tax liability 
on each unit by 10 ECU, and thereby increased the fundamental value by the corresponding 
amount. 
 
In the BearMarket treatment, in periods 8 – 15 of each market, a subsidy of 10 ECU 
was paid in each period to the holder of any unit of asset. This had the effect of reducing the 
fundamental value in each of the last eight periods of the life of the asset. As each subsidy 
was received, the future flow of subsidy payments decreased by 10 ECU. 
 
The third component of the fundamental value was the final buyout. This was a 
payment to the holder of each unit of asset at the end of the 15-period life of the asset. This 
payment was equal to 200 ECU in the BullMarket treatment and to 40 ECU in the 
BearMarket treatment. The values were chosen to make the fundamental value equal to an 
identical value of 120 over the first seven periods in both treatments. The final buyout 
ensured that the fundamental value of the asset was always positive. 
 
Dividends, subsidies and final buyout payments were added to individuals’ cash 
balances at the time they were paid out, and taxes were subtracted from cash balances at the 
moment they were incurred. This meant that positive dividend payments and subsidies added 
to the cash could be used for subsequent purchases. Negative dividends and taxes reduced the 
cash available for later purchases. 
 
At the beginning of period 1 in each market, agents received an initial endowment of 
10 units of asset and 3600 ECU of cash that they could use for transactions. Cash balances 
and asset inventories were required to be positive. In other words, margin buying and short-
selling were not allowed. The markets were computerized and used continuous double 
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auction trading rules (Smith, 1962) implemented with the z-Tree computer program 
(Fischbacher, 2007).  
 
In a continuous double auction, the market is open for a fixed interval of time. At any 
time, any agent, who has sufficient cash or units to conclude the transaction, may submit an 
offer to the market. An offer specifies a price at which the agent is willing to either buy or sell 
a share. Any trader with sufficient funds and units of asset to complete the transaction may 
accept any outstanding offer at any point in time. All offers are displayed to all agents on their 
computer screens. Upon acceptance of an offer, a trade is concluded and the asset and cash 
transferred between the transacting parties. Within our 15-period markets, inventories of 
assets and cash carried over from one period to the next so that for each individual, the 
quantities of cash and assets held at the beginning of period t+1 were the same as those held 
at the end of period t, adjusting for any dividends and subsidies received as well as for any 
taxes paid. Each of the 15 periods of a market lasted two minutes. 
 
A subject’s entire earnings over a market were equal to the amount of cash he held at 
the end of the final period of that market, after the last dividend, tax/ subsidy, and final 
buyout were paid. This was equal to his initial endowment of cash, plus any earnings from 
dividends, plus any subsidies received, minus any taxes paid, plus proceeds from sales of 
shares, minus expenditures on purchases of shares, plus any final buyout received. ECU were 
converted to Euros at a rate of 500 ECU = 1 Euro.  
 
Given the total initial endowment of cash and assets, we determine the demand and 
supply functions for the periods in which the fundamental value of the asset is constant. Also, 
considering the changes in the fundamental value and the cash constraints, we determine the 
demand functions for the last period of the two treatments in order to provide some insight 
about how the opportunity sets of traders at a given point in time affect prices.  Figure 2 
below shows a fixed supply of 100 units in a market with 10 traders. In such a market, the 
demand in any of the first eight periods of either of the two treatments, as shown in the graph, 
is determined by the total amount of cash available and the fundamental value of the asset that 
remains constant in these periods. Given the shape of the demand curve, transaction prices 
will tend to be lower than equilibrium prices (also this is the case of the last period of the bull 
market and bear market also shown in the figure) since it is the only way of realizing gains 
from trade for both buyers and sellers.  In the last period of the bear market, the demand curve 
reflects the greater amount of cash available in the market relative to the value of the assets, 
due to subsidies received and the low fundamental value. These circumstances create a flat 
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shaped demand up to a very large quantity.  On the other hand, due to the cash constraints in 
the last period of the bull market, where the cash available for purchases relative to the value 
of shares is reduced because of taxes on each unit and a greater fundamental value, the point 
where the willingness to pay begins to decrease occurs at a lower quantity of units. In this 
case, if we consider the possibility of more negative dividends drawn in a session (as it can be 
seen in the example described by the dashed line in figure 2), the demand could be shifted in 
such a way that equilibrium prices would be below the fundamental value.  
 





 The five hypotheses we advance concern market-level activity, and are based on 
previous studies in experimental and behavioral economics. We readily concede that we 
anticipated some of the hypotheses to be more likely to be upheld in the data than others. 
Nevertheless, the hypotheses express what might reasonably be predicted from previous 
studies. The first is that the two treatments, BullMarket and BearMarket, would exhibit 
equally effective price discovery. Although Giusti et al. (2012) and Huber et al., (2012) find 
that increasing fundamental value trajectories exhibit better price discovery than decreasing 
ones, both of these studies differ from ours in a number of ways. The most basic difference is, 
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of course, that our design features a delayed onset of the fundamental value trend. Thus, we 
maintain the ex-ante expectation that there would be no difference in adherence to 
fundamentals between the two treatments.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The Bullmarket and Bearmarket treatments track fundamentals equally 
closely. 
 
 To evaluate hypothesis 1, we compare the Average Dispersion (AD) between the two 
treatments. This is an overall measure of market mispricing relative to fundamentals over the 
entire lifetime of the asset. It is defined as AD = Σt |(pt – ft)|/15, where pt is the average price in 
period t and ft is the fundamental value in period t. AD is the absolute difference between 
price and fundamental, averaged over the 15 period horizon. Hypothesis 1 is that AD is not 
different between the increasing and the decreasing treatments.  
 
 The second hypothesis also originates from previous experimental studies. These 
have shown that as the same subjects participate in a second market under identical 
conditions, the prices at which they trade move closer to fundamentals (Smith et al., 1988; 
Dufwenberg et al., 2005; Haruvy et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
convergence to fundamentals would occur at different rates in the two treatments. This is 
suggested by the results of Noussair and Powell (2010), who find that experience leads to 
more rapid price discovery in their Peak than in their Valley treatment. This would suggest 
that convergence would occur faster in the BearMarket than in the BullMarket treatment. This 
is because the Bullmarket treatment has an upward fundamental trend in the latter part of the 
session, like the Valley treatment. In contrast, Bearmarket has a downward trend like the Peak 
treatment. However, our view is that the analogy is too speculative to advance an ex-ante 
hypothesis that convergence would occur at different rates in the two treatments.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater experience leads to closer adherence to fundamental values. Market 
2 tracks fundamentals more closely than Market 1. 
 
The next three hypotheses concern the relationships between each of tasks in phases 1 - 3 and 
market activity in market 4. They concern whether measurement of traders’ characteristics, 
such as risk aversion, loss aversion, and tendency to reflect, can predict the activity in the 
market in which they participate. Hypothesis three relates to risk aversion. Because the asset 
traded in our markets is a risky lottery, it should be valued less by relatively risk-averse 
agents. Thus, we hypothesize that a greater average level of risk aversion among participants 
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in the session, as measured in part three of the session, would correlate negatively with price 
level in part four. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Greater risk aversion on the part of the average trader is correlated with 
lower prices in the asset market. 
 
We quantify price level using a measure called Average Bias or AB (Haruvy and Noussair, 
2006). This equals AB = Σt (pt – ft)/15 and is a measure of price level relative to fundamentals. 
We correlate it with the average level of safe choices in part three, using each session as the 
unit of observation. Furthermore, within each session, we expect that relatively risk-averse 
individuals would be net sellers of units to relatively risk tolerant ones, exploiting the gains 
from exchange that can ensue from such a transfer of risk. By the end of the market, relatively 
risk tolerant agents should hold more units of asset than more risk averse ones. 
 
 Just as we assert that risk aversion is related to the price level, we hypothesize that 
loss aversion is related to the quantity transacted. Consider a loss-averse agent who has 
purchased a unit and now wishes to sell a unit. This agent may be reluctant to sell a unit at a 
price lower than the last price at which he purchased. Alternatively, this reluctance could 
occur at another reference price, such as the average price paid in previous purchases, but a 
similar intuition would emerge. Similarly, consider a loss-averse agent deciding whether or 
not to purchase a unit. He may be reluctant to purchase the unit at a price greater than a 
reference price, which might be for example the one at which he concluded his last sale. This 
reluctance to trade may create friction which would lower transaction volume. On the basis of 
this intuition, we hypothesize that the average loss aversion of a cohort measured in part 1 of 
the session is negatively correlated with the average quantity transacted in the markets, in 
which the cohort participates in later in the session.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Greater loss aversion is correlated with lower transaction volume in the asset 
market. 
 
At the individual level, we would expect the relatively loss-averse individuals within a 
session to conclude fewer trades than their less loss-averse counterparts. The final hypothesis 
concerns the relationship between market activity and the cognitive reflection test 
administered in part two of the experiment. The CRT test measures the willingness to think 
about a decision problem, and it is plausible to conjecture that individuals who are prepared to 
do so are also more likely to thinking about the fundamental value of the asset when trading 
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in the market. Thinking about the fundamental might encourage an individual to use it as a 
limit price. Indeed, Corgnet et al., (2012) report that subjects with higher CRT scores tend to 
make purchases at price below, and sales at prices above, fundamental values. It is likely that 
the greater the proportion of people who approach their trading decisions in this way, the 
greater the tendency is for prices to be close to fundamentals. We thus hypothesize that 
Average Dispersion would be negatively correlated with the average CRT score of the traders 
in the market. 





4.1 Market Price Patterns and Treatment Differences 
 
Figure 3 below shows the time series of transaction prices for each market in the two 
treatments. Each individual time series corresponds to the activity of one of the 16 groups. 
The two panels in the upper portion of the figure correspond to the first and second markets 
of the BullMarket treatment. The vertical axes indicate the price, the horizontal axes mark the 
time period, and the fundamental value is given by the bold black line. Each time series 
represents the average price in each period in one of the sessions. The middle portion of the 
figure represents the analogous data for the BearMarket treatment for the sessions conducted 
at Tilburg University. The lower portion contains the data from the BearMarket sessions run 
at Jaume I.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates several basic patterns. The first is that prices in the BearMarket 
treatment are closer to fundamental values than those in the BullMarket treatment, especially 
for market 2 in the sessions conducted at Tilburg. The second is that prices in the second 
market within each treatment are closer to fundamentals than those in the first market in some 
sessions but not in others. In the BearMarket treatment sessions conducted at Tilburg, pricing 
in market 2 is obviously closer to fundamentals than market 1. The sessions conducted at 
Jaume I tend to exhibit greater deviations from fundamentals than those conducted at Tilburg. 
In the Bullmarket treatment, in the first eight periods, prices depart substantially from 





Figure 3: Average Market Prices, All Markets 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Left Panels: Market 1; Right Panels: Market 2 
The data are the average transaction price in a period. Each time series is a separate session. The 







 Statistical tests conducted using the 12 Tilburg sessions, enabling control for subject 
pool effects, confirm the impressions gleaned from the figures. A Mann-Whitney rank sum 
test fails to reject the hypothesis that the average dispersion is equal between the Bullmarket 
and Bearmarket treatments in market 1 (z = 1.441, p = .149). For market 2, however, the test 
yields z = 2.082 (p = .0379), which is significant at conventional levels. We thus support 
hypothesis 1, but only in market 2, when subjects have previously obtained experience with 
the market process. In market 2, the Bearmarket treatment leads to more accurate pricing. 
 
The average dispersion is lower in market 2 than in market 1 in only three of the six 
Bullmarket sessions. However, in all six sessions of Bearmarket conducted in Tilburg, prices 
exhibit lower average dispersion in market 2 than in market 1 (z = 2.082, p = 0.037) Thus, 
there is mixed support for hypothesis 2. It is supported in the Bearmarket treatment, but not in 
Bullmarket.  
 
 Figure 4 below shows the relationship between the average risk aversion of session 
participants and the price level measured by AB in each market. The risk aversion of each 
individual is weighted by her market power in the experiment, and this new variable 
constitutes the horizontal axis. The market power is a weighted average of the percentage of 
the shares outstanding and the percentage of the total stock of cash that an individual holds. It 
is used as a measure of influence in the market (see Haruvy and Noussair, 2006, or Haruvy et 
al., 2013). The market power of individual i at time t, denoted as MPit, equals .5*sit/isit + 
.5*mit/imit, The variable sit equals the number of units of asset that i has at the beginning of 
period t and mit is the amount of cash that individual i has at the beginning of the period. The 
weighting of risk aversion by market power is intended to reflect the fact that the risk 
attitudes of those individuals with greater capacity to buy and sell tend to have more influence 
on market activity.   
 
In figure 4, The Average Bias for a market is indicated on the vertical axis. Each data 
point corresponds to one market in one session. The figure shows the relationship suggested 
in hypothesis three for the BullMarket treatment, though the relationship does not appear for 
BearMarket. For the pooled data from both treatments however, the correlation between 
average risk aversion for a trader cohort and the Average Bias in their market is -.528, 
significant at the p =.035 level in market 1. The correlation is -.511 in market two, significant 




Figure 4: Correlation Between Risk Aversion Weighted by Market Power and Average 




Risk aversion weighted by market power equals [(Number of safe choices in part 3 by individual i)*(i’s 
average market power over the 15 period market)], averaged over all traders in the market. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between average trader loss aversion by session 
and the volume of trade in each treatment. The loss aversion of individuals in the session, 
weighted by their market power, is plotted against the volume of trade by session. The figure 
shows that there is a negative relationship ( -.19) in market 1 for the BearMarket treatment, 
which is consistent with hypothesis 4, though the correlation is not significant. The 
relationship is weaker in market two ( -.12), suggesting that the relationship becomes yet 
weaker with experience.  There is no relationship between these two measures in the 
BullMarket treatment.
3
 Overall, we find only very weak support for hypothesis 4. 
Figure 5: Relationship Between Loss Aversion and Number of Transactions in a 
Market, Both Treatments 
 
 
Loss aversion weighted by market power equals [(Number of safe choices in part 1by individual i)*(i’s 
average market power over the 15 period market)], averaged over all traders in the market. 
                                                          
3
 Loss aversion might also influence prices when negative dividends are possible as is the case for the 
first 8 periods of either treatment when the fundamental value is constant and also for the last 7 
periods in the BullMarket treatment. In this case, more loss averse traders might tend to sell more 
units when negative dividends are possible and this would lead to lower pricing than fundamentals. 
However, we do not find evidence of such behavior when correlating loss aversion with the number 
of units held by each trader at the end of period 8 (= .006; p=.940). The correlation between loss 
aversion and number of units held at the end of period 15 in the BullMarket treatment was = .105, 
also not significant (p=.451). 
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Figure 6 relates the average CRT score of session participants, weighted by their 
market power, to the Average Dispersion in each session. The figure shows that the greater 
the average CRT of the group, the closer is their conformity to fundamentals. The correlation 
is -.433 and significant in market 1, (p =.093) as well as market 2, -.442 (p = .086). Thus there 
is strong support for hypothesis 5. This result is enforced by a positive relationship between 
individuals’ market power and their CRT score (=.144; p=.094).4 
 




                                                          
4
 We also explored the possibility of a negative correlation of market power with loss aversion and 
risk aversion. We find no significant result for loss aversion (= .02; p=.75 for Market 1 and = -.02; 
p=.75 for Market 2). Risk aversion, on the other hand, seems to be negatively correlated with market 
power, though the relationship is only significant for the second market (= -.09; p=.28 for Market 1 
and = -.17; p=.04 for Market 2) 
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4.1.1 Summary of market level results 
This subsection has provided evidence that the BearMarket treatment adheres more closely to 
fundamentals than the BullMarket treatment. These results contrast with typical results 
obtained in markets for assets exhibiting an immediate onset of a trend in fundamental value, 
in which decreasing fundamentals are associated with greater mispricing. Also, under 
BearMarket, there is a systematic decrease in the level of mispricing in the second market that 
a cohort participates in compared to the first. The average risk aversion of traders correlates 
negatively with the price level. The average CRT score correlates negatively with the distance 
between price and fundamentals. In the next subsection, we explore the individual behavior 
underlying these patterns. 
 
4.2. Individual Behavior 
 
4.2.1. Risk aversion, loss aversion, CRT score, and individual trading behavior 
We have observed, in section 4.1, that greater average risk aversion among market 
participants is negatively correlated with price level. We now consider whether relatively 
risk-averse individuals tend to sell to those who are less risk averse. This pattern would be 
reflected in a relationship between an individual’s risk aversion, as measured in part 1 of the 
sessions, and how many units of the asset she holds at the end of the last period of the market. 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between an individual subject’s risk aversion and her final 
asset holding at the end of markets 1 and 2. The vertical axis is the measured level of risk 
aversion in part 3 of the session, with 10 corresponding to the greatest, and 1 to the lowest, 
possible risk aversion level. Each data point in figure 7 is the average quantity held at the end 
of a session by individuals of a given risk aversion level. Larger circles indicate a larger 
number of individuals with the corresponding risk aversion level. The Appendix contains 
histograms of the risk aversion, loss aversion and cognitive reflection measures for out 
sample of participants. 
 
The figure illustrates the tendency of individuals who are relatively risk averse to sell 
to those who are less risk averse. This intuitive relationship exploits potential gains from trade 
as risk is transferred to those who have a lower cost of bearing it. The correlation between the 
final inventory of an individual and her risk aversion in the BearMarket treatment is   = -
.197, significant at p = .073. However, the correlation is insignificant under BullMarket ( = -









At first glance this last result seems inconsistent with the fact that the overall 
correlation between average risk aversion of a cohort and price level is greater in BullMarket 
than in BearMarket. However, the latter, a between-session correlation, is perfectly 
compatible with the stronger within-session relationship in BearMarket between individuals’ 
risk aversion and their holdings.  Figure 8 documents the relationship between loss aversion 
and individual trading behavior. The vertical axis shows the value of the loss aversion 
measure in part 1 of the experiment. Higher values indicate greater loss aversion. Loss 
aversion is plotted against the total number of units the individual trade, that is, the sum of her 
purchases and sales, over a 15-period market. Each data point is the average number of units 




Figure 8: Total Number of Trades Individuals Conculde and their Loss Aversion level b  
 
 
The figure shows, in the BearMarket treatment, a relationship between an 
individual’s loss aversion and how much trade he engages in, with relatively loss- averse 
individuals involved in fewer trades. The correlation is -.180 (p = .035) in Market 1 and -.094 
(p = .275) in Market 2.  While this relationship does not appear significantly at the market 
level, in that a more loss averse group trades less than a relatively less loss averse group, it is 
clear that within a session, it is the less loss averse people who trade more. It seems that the 
relatively low number of observations at the market level and the greater presence of within- 
rather than between-group heterogeneity likely accounts for the lack of a significant 
relationship at the market level.   
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Figure 9 plots the CRT score of an individual minus the average for her session on 
the horizontal axis, and her earnings on the vertical. Each data point represents an individual 
participant. The figure shows that higher CRT scores are related to higher earnings. The 
correlations are highly significant for the Bullmarket treatment .291 (p = .000) and for 
Bearmarket treatment .285 (p = .009). In markets with a dispersion of CRT scores, those with 
lower scores earn less, indicating that they make unprofitable trades. In markets in which the 
average score is high, few traders make poor decisions, and prices stay relatively close to 
fundamentals. 
 







4.2.2. Risk aversion, loss aversion, CRT score, and trader strategies 
We now consider how the risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive reflection 
measures we have elicited correlate with trading strategies. To classify traders according to 
the strategies they tend to employ, we use the framework of Haruvy and Noussair (2006) and 
Haruvy et al. (2013). They classify traders into three types, called Fundamental Value 
Traders, Momentum Traders, and Rational Speculators. We classify each of the traders 
participating in our experiment as one of the three types, according to the following criteria.  
We define an individual’s behavior as consistent with the Fundamental Value Trader 
type in period t if either one of two conditions holds. The first condition is that, if pt > ft, then 
sit < si,t-1, where pt is the average price in period t, ft is the fundamental value in period t, and sit 
is the number of units of asset that individual i holds in period t. This means that if prices are 
above fundamentals, trader i is a net seller of units in period t. The second condition is that if 
pt < ft, then sit > si,t-1. If prices are below fundamentals, trader i is a net buyer in period t. The 
fundamental value trader, then, acts as if she is using the fundamental value as a limit price. 
 A trader’s behavior is consistent with the Momentum Trader type if either of two 
conditions holds. The first is that, if pt-1 < pt-2, then sit < si,t-1. The second is that, if pt-1 > pt-2, 
then sit > si,t-1. The momentum traders is a net purchaser in period t if there has been an 
increasing price trend in the last two periods, and sells off units if there has been a decreasing 
trend.  
A trader’s behavior is consistent with the Rational Speculator Trader type if her 
behavior in period t satisfies one of the following two conditions. The first is that, if pt+1 < pt, 
then sit < si,t-1, and the second is that, if pt+1 > pt, then sit > si,t-1. This type of agent anticipates 
the price in the next period in an unbiased manner. She makes positive net purchases if the 
price is about to increase between the current and the next period. She makes net sales if the 
price is about to decrease.    
To classify a subject as one of the trader types, we count the number of periods 
during which a person is consistent with each type, and then classify him as the type with 
which he is consistent for the greatest number of periods. If there is a tie between two types, 
we classify the trader as belonging to each type with proportion .5. If there is a tie between all 
three types, he is assigned each type with proportion .33.  
Table 1 shows the percentage of traders of each type in each treatment and market. It 
shows several interesting patterns. Despite the fact that the BearMarket treatment tracks 
fundamentals more closely than the Bullmarket treatment, the percentage of individuals 
29 
 
classified as each type is very similar. Furthermore, the proportion of players of each type in 
market 1 is very similar to the two previous studies in which a similar classification was made 
for subjects with no prior experience in the same experiment (Haruvy and Noussair 2006, and 
Haruvy et al., 2013)
5
. The fraction of players that are Momentum traders decreases between 
markets 1 and 2 while the proportions that are of the Fundamental Value and Rational 
Speculator types increase. This change in distribution suggests that positive reinforcement is 
occurring, since momentum trading is irrational, resulting in relatively low earnings, while 
the other two types describe trading behaviors that reflect different notions of rationality. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Individuals of Each Trader Type, by Treatment and Market 
 Market1 Market2 
 Flat FV Increasing FV Flat FV Increasing FV 
Fundamental Value 39.00% 33.33% 32.08% 34.91% 
Momentum 28.61% 45.61% 28.30% 30.18% 
Rational Speculator 32.39% 21.06% 39.62% 34.91% 
 
 Market1 Market2 
 Flat FV Decreasing FV Flat FV Decreasing FV 
Fundamental Value 33.94% 39.97% 45.79% 44.00% 
Momentum 30.92% 44.19% 20.47% 35.55% 
Rational Speculator 35.14% 15.85% 33.74% 20.46% 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Both Haruvy and Noussair (2006) and Haruvy et al. (2013) classified 33.1% of their traders as 
Fundamental Value Traders, 25.4% as Rational Speculators, and 36.5% as Momentum Traders. Haruvy 
et al. (2013) categorized 40.1% of their participants as Fundamental Value Traders, 23.8% as Rational 
Speculators, and 36.1% as Momentum Traders. 
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0.0228 0.0047 -0.0771 1   
Loss 
aversion 
0.0775 -0.0902 -0.0337 0.1124 1  
CRT 0.2373*** -0.1934** -0.0248 -0.0394 0.0990 1 
*** correlation sig. at p< .01 















0.1647** -0.1446* 0.0259 1   
Loss 
aversion 
0.1470* 0.0056 -0.1593* 0.1124 1  
CRT 0.1336 -0.2371*** 0.0696 -0.0394 0.0990 1 
*** correlation sig. at p< .01 
**   correlation sig. at p< .05 
*     correlation sig. at p< .1 
 
Table 2 shows the correlations between risk aversion level, loss aversion level, CRT 
score, and each of the three types. Each individual trader constitutes one observation. The 
table reveals the following patterns. Cognitive reflection test scores exhibit a significant 
correlation with being a fundamental value type in market 1. This is consistent with previous 
results reported by Corgnet et al., (2012). CRT score is negatively correlated with momentum 
trading. These are intuitive relationships since momentum trading is an irrational strategy, 
while fundamental value trading requires the trader to interpret the future streams of 
dividends, final buyout value, taxes and subsidies as a limit price.  
In market two, other intuitive relationships appear, perhaps because traders have had 
some time and experience so that they are able to formulate trading strategies that more 
accurately reflect their preferences.  In market 2, there is a significant positive correlation 
between risk aversion and fundamental value trading. This relationship reflects risk-averse 
agents selling their units in large quantities when prices are greater than fundamentals. Loss 
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averse agents are also less likely to be rational speculators in market 2, likely reflecting their 
desire to avoid the potential losses that one risks when speculating. There is no significant 
relationship between risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score, suggesting that they are 
largely orthogonal characteristics.  
Table 3.a:  Determinants of Average Dispersion with and without Risk Aversion, Loss 
Aversion, and CRT as Explanatory Variables   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment -24.04** -17.21 -22.85** -29.52*** 
Experience -6.39 -6.39 -6.39 -6.39 
Subject pool 31.66***    
Risk Aversion  13.74**  14.75*** 
CRT Score   -21.28*** -23.28*** 
Loss Aversion    4.79 
 R2 = 0.2464 
N=32 
 
R2 = 0.1867 
N=32 
 
R2 = 0.2665 
N=32 
 
R2   = 0.4207 
N=32 
 
Table 3.b:  Determinants of Average Bias with and without Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion, 
and CRT as Explanatory Variables   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Treatment 9.64 17.75 15.67 30.78** 
Experience 4.73 4.73 4.73 4.73 
Subject pool -10.88 3.43   
Risk Aversion  -32.57***  -33.09*** 
CRT Score   19.25 21.84** 
Loss Aversion    -2.41 













Tables 3a and 3b illustrate how much between-session variation in market prices that 
risk aversion, loss aversion and CRT score can explain. The dependent variables in the 
estimations reported in the table are the Average Dispersion and Average Bias. Model 1 
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includes the experience level of the subjects (whether the data come from market 1 or market 
2), the treatment in effect, and the location in which the session was conducted. These 
variables explain 24% of the variance in AD and only 1% of the variance in AB. When the 
average risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score are added to the specification in model 4 
(location is dropped because the different subject pools differ in the average level of CRT 
score), the explanatory power of the model increases substantially, to 42% for AD and 46% 
for AB. Thus, knowing the average risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score of a group of 
traders allows 46 times as much price level variation to be explained than when these 
measures are unavailable.  
Furthermore, models 2 and 3 in each table are intended to capture the explanatory 
power of risk aversion alone and CRT score, respectively. We find that risk aversion explains 
more about the average bias as shown in model 2 from table 3.b, and the CRT score explains 
more about the average dispersion as shown in model 3 from table 3.a.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have studied markets in which a trend in fundamentals sets in after 
an interval of constant value. Though the effect requires some trader experience before it sets 
in, prices tend to track fundamentals more closely when the trend is decreasing, in the 
BearMarket treatment, than when it is increasing, in the BullMarket treatment. The contrast 
between our results and those from previous studies indicate that the timing of the onset of a 
trend in fundamentals is an important feature influencing how the trend affects the price 
discovery process. This suggests that markets for assets which have a declining fundamental 
value trend from the moment of their creation, such as some bonds and options, or 
depreciating capital, might exhibit differences in pricing behaviour from those such as stocks 
and commodities that may experience episodes of declining value at later points in their 
lifetimes.    
We observe correlations between risk aversion, loss aversion, cognitive reflection test 
scores, and market outcomes. The greater the average CRT score of the trader cohort, the less 
prices in their market deviate from fundamentals. Greater average risk aversion among the 
cohort of traders correlates with lower prices, though the effect is only significant for the 
BearMarket treatment. Risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT scores, explain much of the 
between-session variation in market outcomes. It is already known that market parameters 
such as the amount of liquidity and the quantity of units of the asset available, as well as 
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institutional features such as the availability of short-selling and of future markets, influence 
pricing in experimental markets. Our results underscore that trader characteristics are also 
important determinants of market behaviour. More risk-averse individuals are more likely to 
sell units and to trade on fundamentals. They are also less likely to trade on momentum. Loss-
averse individuals trade less than their less loss-averse counterparts, and are less likely to 
speculate. Traders with higher CRT scores are more likely to trade on fundamentals and to 









Emotional state and market behavior 
 
1. Introduction 
The connection between asset market price movements and emotions has been widely 
accepted in popular press and commentary. The supposed existence of fear and exuberance as 
influences on prices is reaffirmed with great frequency in such quarters. Positive emotion is 
generally associated with booms and high price levels. Alan Greenspan, while chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, famously remarked that the American stock market exhibited an 
“irrational exuberance” when it experienced a rapid run up in 1996. The remark betrayed a 
belief on his part that the increase had, in part, an origin in positive emotions of traders.
6
 
Galbraith (1984) describes stock market price bubbles as “speculative euphoria”. On the 
other hand, fear is associated with price variability and cited as a force leading to selloffs and 
price declines. Market volatility indices such as the CBOE’s VIX, an index of option prices, 
are referred to colloquially as “fear” indices. The legendary investor Warren Buffett (2008) 
writes, “A simple rule dictates my buying: be fearful when others are greedy and be greedy 
when others are fearful”, associating the presence of fear in the market with profitable 
opportunities to make purchases. 
There is data supporting the contention that traders’ moods can lead to price 
movements at the market level. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find that good weather is 
correlated with higher stock returns, while poor weather does not lower returns compared to 
average weather. They presume that the mechanism whereby this effect operates is through 
the positive effect that weather has on mood. Kamstra et al. (2003) observe that returns are 
relatively low in fall and winter and appeal to a similar intuition to explain their results.  
Sports scores seem to matter for financial returns (Edmans et al., 2007), with home team wins 
translating to higher prices. Bollen et al. (2010) find that Twitter mood predicts subsequent 
                                                          
6
 Our notion of happiness is a short-term emotional state, as distinct from a longer-term, more stable 
state of well-being. Bernanke (2012) clearly articulates this distinction. Happiness is a “Short-term 
state of awareness that depends on a person’s perceptions of one’s immediate reality, as well as on 
immediate external circumstances and outcomes. By "life satisfaction" I mean a longer-term state of 
contentment and well-being that results from a person's experiences over time.”  
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stock market movements. Gilbert and Karahalios (2009) find that the level of anxiety of posts 
on the blog site Live Journal predicts price declines. 
In all cases, more positive emotional states are associated with higher prices. If 
emotions can increase prices, then they can in principle lead to mispricing well above 
fundamental values in some cases. In this chapter we focus on the connection between trader 
emotions and extreme pricing episodes: asset price bubbles and crashes. We use an 
experimental approach, which exploits the fact that bubbles and crashes can be reliably 
created and studied in the laboratory with inexperienced participants. The bubble and crash 
pattern was first observed in the laboratory with a paradigm introduced by Smith et al. (1988). 
Subsequent authors have replicated and established the robustness of this price pattern, and 
the Smith et al. (1988) design has become the dominant experimental paradigm for studying 
bubbles and crashes. We adhere to this design in the work reported here, and it is described in 
section three. 
 
Bubbles can be eliminated in this setting when participants are inexperienced, but it 
requires a very strong framing that deemphasizes the importance of speculative possibilities 
or a considerable degree of specialized instruction. The magnitude of bubbles is sensitive to 
environmental parameters such as the amount of liquidity available (Caginalp et al, 1998), 
institutional factors such as the ability to sell short and the trading institution (Van Boening et 
al., 1993; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2012), and the time path of 
fundamentals (Noussair et al., 2001; Noussair and Powell, 2010; Kirchler et al., 2012; Giusti 
et al., 2012; Breaban and Noussair, 2013). Nonetheless, there is considerable variation within 
all conditions that is unexplained. That is, some sessions generate larger bubbles than others 
despite identical economic structure. We consider here whether variation in the emotional 
state of participants between different cohorts can account for some of this heterogeneity. 
 
In our experiment, we use face reading software to track the emotional state of all 
traders, as captured in their facial expressions. The software provides measures of happiness, 
surprise, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, neutrality, and overall emotional valence. According to 
Elster (1998) emotions can be differentiated from other mental states on the basis of six 
features: cognitive antecedents, intentional objects, arousal, valence, action tendencies, and 
physiological expressions. The work we report here focuses on the last feature, the 
physiological, as manifested in facial expressions. We consider several issues. First, at the 
market level, we study how emotional factors can influence the magnitude of bubbles. We 
test the hypotheses that a positive emotional state on the part of traders before a market opens 
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predicts higher prices, and that fear predicts lower prices. At the individual level, we consider 
which emotions
7
 are linked to better performance, and explore the relationship between loss-
averse decision making and emotional state. Other than one concurrent study on individual 
decision making (Nguyen and Noussair, 2013), this study represents, to our knowledge, the 
first application of face reading in either economics or finance.  
We find a number of strong relationships between emotions, as measured in traders’ 
facial expressions, and market behavior. Positive emotion is associated with higher prices and 
larger bubbles. The more positive the valence of the emotions a group of traders exhibits 
before the market opens, the higher prices are in the subsequent market. Bubbles are driven 
by exuberance in the sense that at the individual level, making purchases during a boom is 
positively correlated with current valence. That is, individuals in more positive emotional 
states make more purchases during a boom. Those who exhibit more neutrality during a crash 
earn greater profits. We also observe a strong correlation between fear and loss aversion, as 
registered in a loss aversion measurement task administered before the market opens. 
 
2. Previous literature 
Moods have been linked to behavior in a number of well-known experimental 
paradigms, and some of these involve markets. For example, positive moods can influence 
product choices (Meloy et al., 2000) and bidding in random nth price auctions (Capra et al., 
2010). Johnson and Tversky (1983) argue that a positive mood tends to make beliefs more 
optimistic in the sense that probabilities associated with positive events become distorted in a 
positive direction. This would push individuals to make less risk-averse choices when they 
are more positive emotional states. This suggests one mechanism whereby emotional state 
could influence market behavior. Asset markets involve the trading of a risky lottery and thus 
more risk-averse agents would tend to place lower value on the asset, and their activity would 
lead to lower demand and prices. Indeed, Breaban and Noussair (2013) find that more risk-
averse cohorts of traders tend to generate lower prices in experimental asset markets. Fellner 
and Macjekovsky (2007) find that risk aversion on the part of a group of traders is associated 
with lower trading volume. Bosman and Riedl (2003) find that negative mood increases 
bidding in first-price sealed bid auctions, which is consistent with exhibiting more risk averse 
                                                          
7 By emotion, we refer to short-term affective states. This is a distinct, though related, phenomenon to 
that of mood. See Capra (2004) for a discussion. While moods are of relatively low-intensity, diffuse, 
and enduring affective states without a salient antecedent cause, emotions are more intense and short 




behavior. Lowenstein et al. (2001), surveying a large body of research in psychology, argue 
that a direct link exists between decision making under risk and emotional state. 
 
Fear, in particular, has been associated with risk aversion in a number of studies. 
Lerner and Keltner (2003) find that fear is associated with pessimistic risk assessments and 
anger with optimistic ones. Since pessimistic risk assessments lead to more risk-averse 
decisions with respect to objective risks, fear correlates positively with risk aversion.  Kugler 
et al. (2012) obtain similar results in a different impersonal lottery based task. Nguyen and 
Noussair (2013) also find that fear in facial expressions is positively correlated with risk 
averse choices.  
 
We are aware of three previous studies that explore the role of emotion in generating 
bubbles in experimental asset markets. All three papers consider markets with the structure of 
Smith et al. (1988), as we do here. Andrade et al. (2012) induce mood exogenously with film 
clips before the market opens. Subjects watch video clips that are (a) exciting, pleasant and 
arousing, (b) neutral, (c) fearful, or (d) sad. They find that the pleasantly exciting video clips 
are associated with larger bubbles than the other three treatments. The other three conditions 
are not different from each other in terms of average asset prices.  
 
Lahav and Meer (2010) conduct an experiment with two treatments, which they call 
the positive and neutral treatments. Like Andrade et al., they induce mood by showing film 
clips to subjects before the market opens. Positive effect was induced with routines by 
comedian Jerry Seinfeld, and in the neutral treatment, no clip was shown. They find that the 
positive treatment is characterized by greater bubbles and higher prices than the neutral 
treatment, though the neutral treatment nonetheless generated price bubbles. 
 
Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2011) conduct an experiment in which emotions are 
tracked over the course of the session. They focus on anger, anxiety, excitement and joy. 
They have four conditions. In all conditions, subjects participate in two asset markets. In two 
of the treatments, individuals rate, on a Likert scale from 1 – 7, how intensely they currently 
feel each of the four emotions. In one of these conditions, subjects can chat with each other, 
and in the other they cannot chat. Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo report that eliciting emotions 
does not in itself have an effect on market prices, but they do find that the level of excitement 
reported is positively correlated with price level. They also find that buying assets is linked to 
excitement and selling assets is connected to anxiety. They do not find a correlation between 
emotional state and trading profits. The work of Andrade et al. (2012), Lahav and Meer 
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(2010), and Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2012) serves as the source of our first hypothesis, 
described in section four, that positive emotional valence on the part of traders is associated 
with higher prices.  
 
Another of our hypotheses is inspired by a finding of Lo et al. (2005) and Lo and 
Repin (2002). These studies consider how emotions affect trading behavior and performance 
in a field setting. They follow a sample of individuals enrolled in a day trading course, and 
administer a survey to these traders after each day of trading. The survey asks several 
questions about emotional state. The authors report that those who exhibit emotions that 
respond more to short-term price movements in time periods of market turbulence earn less 
money and trade more than those who exhibit a weak emotional response. Taken to our 
setting, this would suggest individuals who have a more neutral emotional state during a crash 
have greater earnings. 
 
3. The experiment 
3.1 Experimental design and available data 
The structure of the market was based on the paradigm created and studied in Smith 
et al. (1988). The asset that was exchanged in the market had a finite lifespan of periods. 
At the end of each period , each unit of the asset paid a dividend dt that was 
independently drawn from a distribution that was identical for all periods. In any period t the 
expected dividend E(dt) on a unit of the asset was equal to the expected value of the dividend 
distribution. Dividends were drawn independently in each period. Therefore, the expected 
future dividend stream at time t, , equaled the expected period dividend multiplied 
by the number of periods remaining in the life of the asset. In other words,  = (T – t 
+ 1)E(dt).  
Since dividends were the only source of intrinsic value for the asset, the fundamental 
value  had a particularly simple structure. It was equal, at any time t, to the expected future 
dividend stream from time t onward. In other words, = (T – t + 1)E(dt). In our markets, the 
life of the asset was T = 15, and the dividend was dt {0,8,28,60}, where each realization 
was equally likely, for all t. Thus, E(dt) = 24, and = 24(16 – t) = 384 – 24*t at time t. The 

















expected dividend. Therefore, risk-averse traders could value the asset at considerably less 
than its fundamental value. 
 In each period, each trader had the ability to trade units of the asset for cash with any 
other trader in an open market, provided that he always maintained non-negative cash and 
share balances. Transaction prices were determined in a continuous double-auction market 
(Smith, 1962). This type of market operates in the following manner. Each period, the market 
is open for a fixed time interval, which was two minutes in this experiment. At any time while 
the market is open, any trader can submit an offer to sell or to purchase a share. These offers 
are posted publicly on all traders’ computer screens.  Also at any time, any trader can accept 
an offer that another trader has submitted. When a bid or ask is accepted by a trader, a 
transaction for one share takes place between the trader who posted the offer and the trader 
who accepted it. Thus, within a period, it was possible for different transactions to occur at 
different prices. An individual could trade as much as he wished provided he has sufficient 
cash and units of the asset to complete the trades.  
  
Each subject had an identical portfolio, consisting of an initial endowment of 5 units 
of asset, and 5000 units of experimental currency, at the beginning of period 1. A subject’s 
final earnings in the market were equal to the cash he had at the end of the experiment, which 
corresponded to his initial cash, plus the value of dividends received, plus (minus) any profit 
(loss) from trading. The market was computerized and used the Ztree program developed at 
the University of Zurich (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
Prior to the opening of the asset market, we administered the loss aversion 
measurement task used by Trautmann and Vlahu (2007), which is based on an earlier protocol 
of Fehr and Goette (2007). This task consisted of a series of six choices, presented in a price 
list format. Each choice offered the opportunity to play a gamble which paid 4.5 Euro with 
probability .5 and either -0.5, -1.5, -2.5, -3.5, -4.5 or -5.5 Euro with probability .5, with each 
choice appearing exactly once. Subjects were required to indicate whether or not they 
accepted to play each of the six gambles. The number of gambles one decided not to play is 
interpreted as a measure of her loss aversion.  
 
Subjects completed the task using pen and paper. They submitted all six of their 
decisions simultaneously when they turned in their completed sheet of paper to the 
experimenter. They were informed prior to beginning the task that only one of the decisions 
would count toward their earnings. After all decisions were turned in, a die was rolled. The 
outcome of the roll determined which decision would count for each participant. If a subject 
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had chosen not to play the relevant gamble, she received a payoff of zero for this part of the 
experiment. If a participant chose to accept the selected gamble, a coin was flipped to 
determine whether she received 4.5 Euro or the negative payment specified in the gamble.
8
 A 
separate coin was flipped for each participant who chose the gamble.    
 
Our dataset consists of 13 sessions. The sessions were conducted at Tilburg 
University and all subjects were students at the university. Subjects were recruited via an 
online system. No subject participated in more than one session of the experiment. On 
average, the sessions lasted one hour. Between six and 11 traders participated in each session, 
with an average of eight subjects per session. Participants’ earnings from the asset market 
were converted to Euro at a rate of 500 units of experimental currency to 1 Euro. This 
resulted in an average payment of 15.6 euros (including the loss aversion measurement task). 
 
 
3.2. The Facereader software 
 
Facereader operates in the following manner. The position of the face in an image is 
found using a method called the Active Template Method (ATM). This method places a 
template over an image and calculates the most likely position of the face. A second 
algorithm for face finding, the Viola Jones cascaded classifier algorithm, takes over when the 
Active Template Method cannot locate a face. A model called the Active Appearance Model 
(AAM) describes the location of 55 key points in the face and the facial texture of the convex 
hull defined by these points. The model uses a database of several thousand annotated images 
and calculates the main sources of variation found in the images. Principal Component 
Analysis is used to reduce the model’s dimensionality. The classification of the facial 
expressions is done with an artificial neural network, which takes the vector of 55 locations 
on the face as input. The network was trained with roughly 2000 images of different 
individuals to classify the extent to which a face expresses the six basic universal emotions of 
happiness, surprise, anger, disgust, sadness and fear, as well as neutrality. 
The output of Facereader is in terms of graphics and text. This software´s quantitative 
output is a vector of values for the seven emotions and an overall valence of emotional state. 
The possible values of each emotion range from 0 to 1, and valence ranges from -1 to +1. The 
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 Some subjects experienced real losses in this part of the experiment. However, they were informed 
that there would be subsequent activities in the session in which they could expect to earn money on 
average. No subject ended the session with negative final earnings, because income in the market phase 




values are registered five times per second. Figure 1 illustrates an example of the output of 
Face Reader graphically. As the video is analyzed, the two charts on the right of the figure 
indicate, in real time in both bar graph and time series format, the extent to which each of the 
six basic emotions (as well as neutrality) is reflected in the facial expression. A pie chart, in 
the lower portion of the figure, shows the average intensity of each emotion. These values are 
normalized so that the sum over all emotions equals 1. The valence is an overall measure of 
whether the individual’s emotional state is currently positive or negative. It is given as a time 
series in the upper middle portion of the screen. The measure compares the conformity of the 
facial expression to 'Happy', the only positive emotion, with that to the four negative 
emotions. 
In the present work we do not test for the validity of this software as there are some 
methodology studies in the literature that are aimed to this purpose. There is evidence that 
Facereader output tends to identify the intended emotion of an individual with a high degree 
of success (Uyl and Kuilenberg, 2008). A recent marketing study by Lewinski et al. (2014) 
finds that the Facereader measure of happiness is highly correlated with participants’ self-
reports, even in a setting outside the laboratory. It also corresponds closely to observers’ 
evaluations of the faces considered (Terzis et al., 2010).  
This is the first study to employ face reading in experimental finance. In our opinion, 
face reading is especially well-suited to the study of emotions for several reasons. The first 
reason is that it classifies an individual’s physiological state along emotional dimensions in a 
quantitative manner. This allows us, for example, to claim that one stimulus provokes more 
disgust but less sadness than another, or that a particular decision is taken when an individual 
is surprised rather than angry. A second advantage is that it registers emotional measurement 
in a manner that is completely unobtrusive to the participant, and data acquisition would 
proceed unnoticed if the individual were not informed that it was occurring.
9
 
The third reason is that the facial expressions corresponding to the six basic emotions 
appear to be universal (Ekman and Friesen, 1984).
10
 These expressions accompanying these 
emotions are common to all cultures and primates (Ekman, 1997). They are the same for 
blind and sighted individuals (Matsumoto and Willingham, 2009), which provides strong 
                                                          
9
 Subjects were aware that they were being videotaped but not that their videotapes were to be analyzed 
with facereading software. 
10
 However, recent research on facial expressions and emotions shows that mental representation of 
the basic emotions is different across cultures (Jack et al., 2012). The main finding of this study is that 
Western Caucasian subjects represent each of the six basic emotions with a distinct set of facial 
movements common to the group, whereas Eastern Asian subjects do not. However, the extent to 
which such differences in mental representation of emotions are caused by actual different facial 
expressions is not obvious and needs further investigation.  
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evidence that they are innate.  This means that results of studies such as ours should be 
replicable in different population groups and cultures. Happiness is positive in valence, 
surprise is neutral, and the other four are negative. Happiness and anger are approach 
emotions, which tend to lead an individual to move toward the situation that triggers the 
emotion. Sadness, disgust, and fear, are withdrawal emotions, meaning that an individual 
typically seeks to avoid the stimulus that induces these emotions.  
 

















Subjects were recruited via online system and the only restriction imposed was that 
wearing glasses during the experiment was not allowed.
11
 They were randomly assigned to a 
computer number and handed the instructions for the first part of the experiment, that is, the 
loss aversion test. Instructions were then read aloud to them by the experimenter. They were 
informed that the experiment consisted of two parts and that possible losses in the first part of 
the experiment would be compensated by potential gains in the second one. Once they had 
completed the test with all six decisions, they handed in the sheet of paper on which they also 
provided the computer number they were assigned as well as age and gender. A volunteer 
subject then rolled the die which determined the lottery that was going to count toward their 
earnings. Given the die roll outcome, subjects who had decided to play the chosen lottery, 
then had to toss the coin to determine if they won or lost the amount specified in that lottery. 
The outcome of the coin flip was checked and registered by the experimenter.  
The instructions for the second part of the experiment were then handed to subjects 
and read aloud by the experimenter. Once the general rules of the double auction market were 
explained, subjects had a five minutes practice period in which they could get familiar with 
buying and selling and submitting offers to buy and offers to sell. Following, they were 
explained the specific conditions of the market they were going to participate in, and 
questions and doubts regarding those were addressed.  
The experimenter then informed all participants that during the rest of the experiment 
they were going to be videotaped by a video camera placed on top of their screen, and that the 
recording would only be viewed and used by the experimenter for research purposes. Subjects 
were also informed that it was important that they focus on the market, and that they avoid 
touching their faces or putting any obstacles between them and the camera.  
We used a standard Logitech camera for each subject in the first eight sessions. New 
ones made by Microsoft were installed and used in the last five sessions. This allowed us to 
obtain better video quality and Facereader outcomes
12
. The video recording was started 
manually on each computer by the experimenter, and the Z-tree screen was then showed, so 
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 This restriction was eliminated when Facereader 5 was available for the last 5 sessions, since the 
updated version of the software is capable now to analyze faces though glasses. 
12
 The poor video quality in the first eight sessions had great negative impact on the analysis speed of 
the Facereader software. On average, the ratio was of one minute of video being analyzed in more 
than one hour, which made the task of collecting the data extremely slow. This was also the reason 
for which for the first eight sessions we only analyzed the boom period, the crash period and the 30 
seconds before the market activity started. The better video quality allowed us to analyze the last five 
sessions at an average speed of 1 to 2 minutes.  
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subjects did not see themselves being videotaped. After at least 30 seconds have passed since 
the last video camera was turned on, the market started operating. In order to be able to match 
the timing of the video (since each video started at a different time and had a different length) 
with the market activity, we introduced a visual mark in each video that identified the 
moment at which the Ztree program had started. We did this by simply turning off and on the 
lights in the room at the moment the market started. The change in lighting was captured by 
all video cameras.  
Later on, the videotapes were analyzed with Facereader software for the 30 seconds 
preceding the light mark which indicated the market opening, and for the subsequent part 
considering that every period lasted for 120 seconds. For the first eight sessions, the software 
was run for one video at a time using Facereader 3. For the last five sessions, we used 




We advance several hypotheses about the relationships between emotions and market 
behavior. Most of the hypotheses emerge from previous work. This first is suggested by the 
previous studies of Lahav and Meer (2010), Andrade et al. (2012) and Hargreaves-Heap and 
Zizzo (2012). We hypothesize that the more positive the mood
13
 that traders exhibit before a 
market opens, the greater the price level in the market. Thus, we hypothesize that positive 
mood is positively related to subsequent price, and thus in all likelihood within our setting, to 
greater bubbles. This pattern is also suggested by previous work on auctions, which concludes 




Hypothesis 1:  More positive valence before the market starts, predicts greater subsequent 
prices and a larger bubble later in the session. 
  
To test this hypothesis, we check whether there is a correlation between (a) the 
average emotional valence within a group of traders in the 30 seconds before their market 
                                                          
13
 For hypotheses 1 and 2 we use the notion of mood to refer to the initial emotional state (measured 
before the market starts) because it is not caused by any specific event. For the last two hypotheses 
we talk about emotions given that there is an interaction between emotions and specific events in the 
market.  
14
 We interpret this hypothesis to mean that the market value of the good is greater when the 
individuals trading it are in a more positive emotional state. In a setting such as the bond market, in 
which trading can be made on price or on interest rates, a greater value of the good is associated with 
a higher price and a lower interest rate. If our hypothesis holds, in such markets a positive mood 
would lead to lower interest rates. 
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opens for period one, and (b) the average price over the 15 periods the market is open. 
Valence is a net measure of positivity of emotional state, or in this case, of mood.  
 
We also consider whether fear predicts lower prices. That it should do so is intuitive. 
However, Andrade et al. (2012) fail to detect such an effect, and their attempt to induce fear 
generates similar results to a market in which emotions were not induced. However, 
Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo do find that anxiety, a closely related emotional state, is 
correlated with lower prices. To the extent that fear is associated with risk aversion (see 
Lerner and Keltner, 2001, or Nguyen and Noussair, 2013), fear would lead to lower pricing of 
the lottery that corresponds to the price of the asset. Furthermore, it is possible that those who 
experience fear would be less likely to take on the risk associated with speculation, 
speculative demand would be reduced, and fear would have the effect of lowering prices.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater fear on the part of the average trader before the market opens is 
correlated with lower subsequent prices later in the session. 
 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 were concerned with the average valence and fear present before 
any activity has taken place. The next hypothesis considers the relationship between emotions 
and activity during a bubble. We consider the period during which prices exhibit the greatest 
average increase, and denote this as the boom period. If there is “exuberance” driving demand 
and pushing up prices during a bubble, the common view expressed by commentators, one 
would expect to observe those individuals who have more positive emotional valence during 
the boom period making the most purchases. Hypothesis three is that this pattern would 
appear in our data.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Booms: During a boom, individuals with more positive valence make greater 
net purchases.  
 
While hypothesis 3 relates to booms, hypothesis 4 has to do with the emotional 
correlates of crashes. Hypothesis 4 consists of three parts. The first has to do with the overall 
strength of emotions during a crash and trader profits. Lo and Repin (2002) and Lo et al. 
(2005) find that those who exhibit less volatility in their emotional state in the face of 
fluctuations in the market have greater earnings. In our experiment, the analogy would be a 
hypothesis that the level of neutrality in one’s facial expression is correlated with greater 
trading profits. The second and third parts of the hypothesis concern the emotions associated 
with the rapid decrease in asset value that occurs during a crash. Those who have more units 
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of asset incur greater losses during a crash than those with fewer units. We hypothesize that 
two distinct emotional episodes accompany a crash. During the market freeze-up and price 
decline, there is fear. This fear is presumably greater for those individuals who hold more 
units of the asset, as they have more at risk and are therefore losing more during the crash. At 
the end of a crash, there is less uncertainty and the consequences of the crash are known. 
Those who hold more units have incurred the greatest losses. Thus we expect the negative 
emotions that appear after adverse events: anger, disgust and sadness (fear appears in 
anticipation of a possible adverse event) to be positively correlated with how many units an 
individual holds at the end of a crash.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Crashes: (a) Traders who exhibit greater average neutrality during a crash 
period achieve greater final earnings. (b) Traders who hold more units at the beginning of a 
crash period exhibit more fear on average during the period. (c) Traders who hold more units 




The time series of transaction prices in each of the eight sessions are shown in figure 
2a, along with the time path of fundamental value. In the figure, the vertical axis is in terms of 
experimental currency, and the horizontal axis indicates the market period. As can be seen in 
the figure, there are large differences between sessions, but in most sessions the bubble and 
crash pattern is observed. Typically, prices remain above fundamental values for a 
considerable period of time, and then exhibit a rapid fall toward fundamental value.  




Figure 2b: Standard Deviation of Transaction Price, All Periods, All Markets 
 
  
Figure 2b illustrates the standard deviation of transaction prices within each period, 
by session. Because the double auction market system allows trades to be concluded at 
different prices within a market period, the standard deviation of prices within a period can be 
substantial. This is especially the case during an episode of rapid price movement, such as a 
crash. The figure shows a consistent pattern. While the standard deviation differs by session, 
it tends to be greatest at the beginning of the life of the asset and during the crash. It is 
smallest near the end of the asset’s life, when prices adhere relatively closely to fundamental 
values.  
The relationship between a particular bubble and crash episode and the dynamics of 
emotion is illustrated in figures 3a – 3c. The data are from session 8, which exhibits a 
particularly large and obvious bubble and crash. The first two panels show that a crash occurs 
in period 11, and the crash is accompanied by a surge in price variance. In the third panel, the 
strength of the average level of several emotions that members of the session cohort exhibit 
over period 10 – 12, the periods just before and during the crash, is plotted. These emotions 
are anger, fear, happiness, and surprise. They are normalized at the levels observed in period 
10, just before the onset of the crash. 
The data show a clear pattern. Sadness and anger exhibit modest increases during a 
crash as traders’ paper wealth declines. However, fear and surprise exhibit sharp increases, as 
uncertainty increases. By period 12, when the crash is ending, surprise has fallen sharply, and 
fear has decreased modestly. However, sadness and anger continue to increase, as traders 
realize the extent of the losses the crash has created. The figure illustrates the existence of an 
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Figures 3a – 3c: Market 8, Time Series of Mean Transaction Price, Standard 




                                                          
15 The facial expression data exhibit several broad characteristics. The first is that the valence is 
typically negative. This likely means that participation in experiments yields disutility for participants 
compared to other activities. There is great volatility in emotional state even over short time intervals. 
This may reflect the large number and heterogeneity of events that one experiences in a period. There 
is no discernible decline in the overall strength of emotion over time, over the roughly 35-minute 
period the asset market is in progress. Anger tends to be greater at the outset, possibly reflecting the 
fact that individuals who are concentrating tend to look like they are angry (see Zaman and Shrimpton-
Smith, 2006), but within a few minutes it stabilizes. Valence reflects this pattern, typically being very 
negative at the very beginning of a session but stabilizing at a moderately negative level for the rest of 
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  We now evaluate the hypotheses advanced in section three. The first two 
hypotheses are about the relationship between the initial emotional profile and the 
overall price pattern, and are summarized as results 1 and 2. Here we use the average 
emotional state of traders over the 30 seconds prior to any market activity, in order to 
compute a baseline measure of the subjects’ mood rather than an emotional response to 
a certain stimulus. An alternative metric of aggregate emotional state would weight 
each individual´s emotional state by the number of trades or perhaps by the number of 
offers they make. However, all players are in an identical position before the market 
opens, and the purpose of the measure is to predict beforehand what the market price 
level will be without the influence of the market activity on traders emotions. In 
chapter 3 we study the relation between individual emotional state and price 
movements in detail.  
 
Result 1: A more positive mood before the market opens is positively correlated 
with subsequent market price level.  
 
Support for Result 1: We take the average valence that Facereader measures over the 
30-second interval before the market opens for each subject. We then average it for all 
subjects in a session. Then we correlate the average for a session with the average 
amount that price exceeds fundamental value over the course of the session
16
. Figure 4 
below plots the average initial group valence against the average price level over the 
15-period life of the asset. The figure shows a clear positive relationship between mood 
and price. The Spearman correlation between valence in a session and average price 











                                                          
16
 The same results would obtain if we used the average price difference from fundamentals pt – ft. This 
difference is referred to as the Bias in a market by Haruvy and Noussair (2006). 
17
 The correlation between the variance of valence among participants before a session begins, and the 
volume of trade over the entire session, is .12, and is not significant at conventional levels. 
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Figure 4: Valence Prior to Market Open and Price Level 
 
 




Result 2: Average trader fear before the market opens is negatively correlated 
with the subsequent price level in the market. 
 
Support for result 2: The relationship between the average fear a cohort expresses 
before the market opens and price level over the subsequent market is very pronounced. 
Figure 5 relates the fear that Facereader registers in the average trader in a given 




























































Initial emotional state 
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relationship between the two variables. The correlation is highly significant (ρ = -0.549, 
p = 0.06). □ 
Indeed, all the other emotions considered separately also correlates with 
subsequent price level. The three negative emotions, sadness, anger, and disgust, 
correlate negatively with price level at ρ = -.381, -.428, and -.333, respectively, while 
happiness and neutrality correlate positively with price level at ρ = .476 and .357. 
While none of these correlations are significant, they are consistent with higher (lower) 
prices being associated with positive (negative) emotional states. 
One of the mechanisms through which emotions affect market behavior and 
subsequent prices might be the expectations that traders form regarding future 
dividends and prices. Therefore more optimistic prior beliefs on the part of the average 
trader in a market could improve her mood leading to more purchases and higher 
prices. Similarly, pessimistic beliefs before the market opens might lower prices later in 
the market through the emotional channel of fear. In our experimental design 
expectations are not elicited, though future research could do so with the aim of 
establishing such a relationship between emotional state and expectations. A dynamic 
interaction could be at work since expectations affect emotional state in a market as 
well as the emotions could interfere in the process of forming expectations. Emotions 
and expectations, together with opportunity sets and market circumstances, might all be 
components of an investor’s sentiment.   
For hypotheses three and four, we consider the average emotional state for each 
subject during the boom and crash period, respectively. We then compute the average 
emotional state for each session.  
We now consider hypothesis three, which relates individuals’ emotional 
valence to their behavior during a boom. The boom period of a session is defined as the 
period with the greatest net price increase over the immediately preceding period, that 
is, the period t that maximizes pt – pt-1 within a session. Figure 6 shows the level of 
valence on the horizontal axis for each individual in the eight sessions, and the net 
change in her holding of shares within a period. The data are from the two-minute 





Figure 6: The Relationship between Individual Emotional Valence and Net 




Result 3: During a boom, valence is positively correlated with net purchases  
Support for result 3: The correlation between vit, the valence of individual i in period 
t, and sit – sit-1, the next purchases of individual i in period t (sit is the quantity of asset 
individual i holds at the end of period t) during the boom period is 0.323 (p = 0.026). 
The current cash endowment could be affecting both valence and purchases positively, 
though our results do not show such an effect. The correlation between mit-1 (cash at the 
beginning of period t) and vit is equal to 0.0007 (p=0.996) and the correlation between 
mit-1 and sit – sit-1  is -0.03 (p= 0.796). 
A number of interesting related patterns also appear in the data. The correlation 
between happiness and net purchases in the boom period t is also significant (ρ 
=0.3010, p = 0.04). However, the correlation between net purchases in the boom period 
and fear is close to zero (ρ = 0.0188, p = 0.9). Average valence is not greater on 
average during a boom than at other times. Before the market opens it averages -.18, 
during the boom period it equals an average of -.29, and during crash it is -.28. 
Given the positive relationship found between emotional state and asset 
holdings during a boom period, we further considered the possible relationship between 
the individual’s mood before the market open and their final asset holdings at the end 
of the experiment. No significant relationship was found though between initial valence 


























trading strategies on a long run, but emotions are closely related to decision making in 
the short run and especially in high prices environments. 
The first part of the hypothesis four is that more neutrality during a crash is 
correlated with greater average earnings. Figure 7 plots the relationship between the 
level of neutrality individuals exhibit during a crash period, which we define as the 
period with the greatest price decrease from the preceding period, and the final earnings 
an individual accrues over the entire 15-period market. The figure suggests that more 
neutrality during a crash is correlated with better performance. The support for result 4 
confirms this impression. In addition, the hypothesis postulates that at the individual 
level, the number of units held during the crash period, which measures the amount of 
paper losses incurred during the period, correlates with the four negative emotions. 
However, we observe that none of these negative emotions is related to the extent of 
these losses. 
 





























Result 4: Traders who exhibit greater neutrality during a crash achieve higher 
earnings.  
 
Support for result 4: The correlation, at the level of the individual, between her 
average neutrality during the crash period and her final earnings is 0.205 (p = 0.16). 
Neutrality correlates negatively with units held at the end of the crash period at ρ = -.27 
(p = .064). The other emotions do not correlate with the number of units held, and thus 
the amount of unrealized capital losses, during a crash. The results are similar if the 
units held at the beginning of the crash period are considered (very few units are 
exchanged during a crash because of very low demand). □ 
 
 The last result, five, describes a strong correlation between loss aversion and fear. 
The loss aversion protocol that was administered at the beginning of the sessions, and 
the measurement of the emotional profile of individuals before the market opens, 
permit an analysis of the correlation between loss aversion and the emotional state of 
participants at the individual level that is independent of any experience on the market. 
As summarized in result 5, those who make more loss-averse decisions exhibit more 
fear in their facial expressions, and have a more negative overall emotional state. There 
is no correlation between loss aversion and any other of the six basic emotions or with 
neutrality. 
 
Result 5: Individuals who exhibit more fear make more loss-averse decisions. Loss 
aversion is not significantly correlated with anger, happiness, sadness, disgust, 
surprise or neutrality. Loss aversion is negatively correlated with the valence of 
emotional state. 
 
Support for Result 5: Table 1 contains the correlations between the number of 
gambles declined in the loss aversion task and the average consistency of facial 
expressions with each of the six emotions that Facereader registers in the 30 seconds 
before the market opens. A greater number of gambles declined indicates greater loss 
aversion. The table shows that the correlation between fear and loss aversion, .3427, is 
positive and significant at the p < .05 level. The correlation between loss aversion and 
valence is negative (ρ = -.3012, p < .05). In contrast, none of the correlations with other 




We now study the feedback between an individual’s performance in the market 
and her emotional state. Define the value of an individual’s asset/cash position at any 
point in time as wit = cit + ptsit, where wit is an individual’s wealth at time t, cit is the 
cash that i has at the end of period t, and sit is the quantity of units he holds. We 
conjecture that valence, as well as happiness, would be positively correlated with 
current wealth, which can be measured as the level of cash the player has at present, 
plus the market value of one’s shares. Of course, it is possible that emotional feedback 
occurs exclusively through the price level or through cash holdings, and in that case the 
correlation would be only present for cit or pt. We also conjecture that a subset of the 
negative emotions of fear, anger, disgust, and sadness, evaluated at time t, would be 
negatively correlated with wealth at time t. The regression reported in table 2 considers 
these effects, and is the basis for result 6. 
 




Table 2: Emotional Correlates of Wealth, Cash Balance, Price Level, Volatility, and 
Gender 
 Valence Happiness Anger Fear Surprise Disgust 
Wealth .00008***   .00004**     -.00006*   
Cash    -.00001** .00015***  
Price level .00012***    .00007*** -.00006**  -.00079**  
Price volatility       
Gender .06452**    -.05118** .81038*** .07482*** 
 
Number of observations: 55 
 




















Result 6: Greater wealth is correlated with more positive emotional valence. 
Decomposing this effect into component emotions reveals that price level is 
positively correlated with happiness, while negatively correlated with anger. 
Lower cash holdings are associated with more fear. 
Support for Result 6: Table 2 shows all of the significant effects of current wealth, 
price level, price volatility and gender on each emotion. Overall valence is influenced 
by wealth and price, with greater wealth and higher prices associated with more 
positive valence. Controlling for market variables, women have more positive valence 
than men. Greater wealth is associated with more happiness and less fear. Lower cash 
balance is correlated with more fear. Women are less fearful than men. While price 
volatility is positively correlated with fear, the relationship is not significant in this 
regression.  
It seems straightforward that money and units are positively related to valence, since 
they can be considered as indicators of wealth. However, they also correspond to 
greater opportunities to buy and sell (Friedman et al. (2011)) and this might also be a 
cause of more positive valence. While higher cash and asset holdings expand the 
opportunity set, asset price level changes the opportunities available for a trader 




In this chapter, we study the connection between emotions and asset market 
prices. We find a number of patterns that conform to commonly expressed intuition 
about the link between emotion and asset prices. When traders are in a more positive 
emotional state at the time the market opens, asset prices are higher. When they feel 
more fear, prices are lower. Traders in a relatively positive emotional state are the 
ones making purchases during a boom. Those who keep a neutral emotional state 
during a crash earn greater profits. 
 
A number of factors have been shown to influence the incidence and magnitude 
of bubbles in the laboratory. These include the institutional structure, the time path of 
fundamentals, and the risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive ability of traders. 
The results reported here show that another factor can be added to the list; the 
emotional state of traders. This finding is in agreement with similar results that have 
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recently been obtained (Lahav and Meer, 2010; Andrade et al., 2012; Hargreaves-
Heap and Zizzo, 2012). Thus, it is becoming clear that asset price bubbles in 
experimental markets are a complex phenomenon, subject to many determining 
influences.  
 
 We find a strong correlation between fear and loss aversion. Such a connection is, in 
our view, quite natural and intuitive. Those who anticipate that they will have a more 
negative response to a financial loss exhibit more fear when placed in a situation in 
which losses are possible, and thus make decisions in such a manner as to minimize 
the likelihood of their occurrence.   
 
This study is the first application of face reading to experimental finance. 
This methodology had yielded what are, in our view, coherent results. Our view is 
that the strength of our results contributes to the validation of the methodology. We 
believe that Facereading has considerable potential for the study of markets. In starker 
experimental settings than the one studied here, the emotional response to specific 
events, such as to a price quote one has received, or to a specific transaction one has 
made or observed, can be isolated and studied. In particular, in future work, face 
reading can be used to study face-to-face market transactions. In such situations, 
facial cues are important sources of information about the intentions and emotional 
states of other parties to a potential transaction. In these settings, individuals may try 
to manipulate their facial expression as part of their strategy to obtain more favorable 












Micro-level data analysis on emotions and trading activity 
 
1. Introduction 
Stock market traders are usually imagined and depicted as emotionless calculating 
machines, like Gordon Gekko. This character of the late 80s was portrayed as a 
ruthless, successful and greedy businessman of Wall Street that showed no emotions 
when trading in the stock market. In his talks he seemed to encourage an emotionless, 
unscrupulous and selfish attitude among young investors as the way to succeed. Indeed, 
there is some empirical evidence on emotions affecting performance in financial 
markets. Lo et al. (2005) and Lo and Repin (2002) find that traders who exhibit 
emotions that respond more to short-term price movements in time periods of market 
turbulence earn less money than those who exhibit a weak emotional response. 
However, traders are human beings after all, which means emotions are a relevant 
variable in the asset markets. 
In this chapter we analyse the dynamic relationship between emotions and market 
activity, at both the individual and market levels. In particular we are interested in a 
micro-level analysis, in terms of individual decisions and in terms of short time period, 
to provide a better understanding of the interaction between emotions, market variables 
and individual decision making. It seems reasonable to believe that there is a feedback 
process occurring between these variables in the sense that emotions affect individuals’ 
behaviour, which then has an impact on market activity and on individuals’ wealth, 
which in turn provoke emotional responses from traders. We try to identify the causal 
relationships of these effects in this chapter.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the data set and methodology are described 
in section 2, followed by the hypothesis we wish to test in section 3. The results we 




2. Methodology  
For this analysis we use the data from five of the sessions described in the 
second chapter. In total, 50 subjects participated in these sessions and all of them were 
students at Tilburg University. Subjects were recruited via an online system. No subject 
participated in more than one session of the experiment. Between eight and 11 traders 
participated in each session, with an average of 10 subjects per session.  
The reason to include only these five sessions in this chapter is purely technical.  
Due to an improvement introduced in the video quality in late 2013
18
, in these five 
sessions it was possible to analyse all videos for the entire duration of the experiment. 
Therefore, for all 50 subjects it was possible to match their trading activity with their 
emotional responses. This allows for an analysis of the dynamics between emotions 
and asset market behaviour establishing causal relationships both at individual level 
and market level. 
 
Data description 
 For the analyses presented in this chapter we use two types of data set. First 
of all we consider tick-by-tick data (where each tick is a 10 seconds interval) for the 
individual behaviour analysis. The setting used is a panel data in which 50 subjects are 
the cross-sectional data, and a 10 seconds interval is implemented as time series, which 
means that the time span of the experiment is a total of 202 intervals.  The reason to 
specify the time variable as blocks of 10 seconds is the specific character of emotions. 
Emotions arise as a consequence of some events and last for a few seconds. There is 
little evidence in the literature on emotion duration, but Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) 
find that it depends to a great extent on the intensity of the emotion. Scherer et 
al.(1986) find that different emotions tend to have different duration and they classify 
sadness as the most lasting one, followed by joy, anger and fear. Given that the market 
experience is relatively short (one period lasts 120 seconds) and making decisions 
might take up to a few seconds, we expect that a 10 second interval is enough to 
capture both emotional and behavioural reactions to specific market events as well as 
short enough to capture the reaction to current activity only. 
                                                          
18
 New video cameras with higher resolution were used. 
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 Therefore each emotion variable (happiness, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, 
surprise, neutral and valence) was averaged every 10 seconds beginning with the 
market opening, so that 300 observations that Facereader software provides (30 per 
second) were averaged for each subject. We will refer to the time variable in this data 
set as intervals in order to distinguish it from the time variable named period in the 
second data set. 
 Second, we construct a data set that gathers observations for 50 subjects 
during 15 periods. In this case the emotion variables were averaged over the 120 
seconds of each period and subject. 
 Some descriptive data is shown in Table 1a on the emotions variables across 
the 202 intervals. There are two interesting features to be pointed out. One is that the 
average valence across subjects and intervals is negative, which indicates that subjects 
do not perceive experiments as a positive experience. If we compare the average 
valence in each period, we find that in 77% of the periods the average valence is 
negative. The second is that neutrality is a dominant emotion on average. 
 
Table 1a. Emotions Descriptive data  
 Neutral Happy Sad Angry Scared Disgusted Surprised Valence 
Observations 10020 10020 10020 10020 10020 10020 10020 10020 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.977 
Max .995 .996 .977 .947 .385 .853 .991 .990 
Mean .524 .092 .083 .038 .001 .012 .021 -.029 
Std. Dev. .305 .153 .128 .091 .007 .054 .067 .231 
 
The Facereader software calculates emotional valence by subtracting the value 
of the highest negative emotion from the value of happiness. Within our sample, 
valence is positively correlated with happiness (.706), surprise (.040) and neutrality 
(.024) and negatively correlated with sadness (-.535), disgust (-.284), anger (-.171) and 
fear (-.081). All correlations are significant at 1% level. 
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 Regarding the trading activity, on average there are 33% more offers to sell than to 
buy, and only half of the offers to sell turn into actual trades, as shown in the following 
table. On average there is a trade taking place every 6 seconds. 
 
Table 1b. Trading activity data in a period 
 Nr. Trades Nr. Bids Nr. Asks Avg Prices 
Min 8 12 18 14.53 
Max 47 82 117 923.33 
Average 20.45 34.04 45.22 396.73 
 
 In table 1c below, it is shown that the sample is gender balanced with a total 
number of 27 females and 23 males and they were all Economics or Business students.  
 
Table 1c. Subjects´ profile by session 
Session Female/Male Average Age Average loss aversion 
1 5/5 22.7 3.2 
2 4/4 23.7 3.5 
3 6/4 24.1 2.8 
4 7/4 22.0 4 
5 5/6 23.1 3.5 
 
 The time series of transaction prices is shown in Figure 1 together with the 
fundamental value time path. It is clear that in all of the sessions large bubbles and 
subsequent crashes occur and in some of them prices are twice or even three times 
higher than the fundamental value of the asset. Typically transaction prices are always 
above fundamentals for a considerable length of time and towards the end of the 
experiment they rapidly fall towards fundamentals. 
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 Based on the results we obtained in the previous chapter and on accepted 
economic intuition, we advance several hypotheses about the interaction process 
between emotions and individual behaviour, as well as between emotions and market 
variables.  
 At the individual level, we have so far established a positive correlation 
between average happiness and the number of purchases during a boom. This is already 
an important result since it is the first connection found between emotions captured 
through physiological responses and market activity, though no causality in that sense 
could be established with the available data.  
 It is plausible to conjecture that positive valence causes purchases, due to 
more optimistic beliefs or a less risk averse attitude generated by a positive emotional 
state. This conjecture is in line with the affective generalization hypothesis of Johnson 
and Tversky (1983) that addresses the role of affect in judgments of probabilities. They 
argue that negative emotions trigger more pessimistic risk assessments, while positive 
emotions entail more positive risk assessments, and this leads individuals in a more 
































hypothesise that a positive emotional state at any time in the market will cause greater 
net purchases in the moments immediately following.  
Hypothesis 1a: A more positive emotional state at time t-1 makes individuals more 
likely to make purchases at time t.  
 Also in the previous chapter we hypothesised that traders who owned more 
units would experience more fear at the time of a crash. We found no evidence to 
support this hypothesis. The argument behind it was that the crash would actually occur 
because fearful people would attempt to sell, and often succeed in doing so, pushing 
prices down. Based on this argument we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Individuals experiencing more fear at time t-1 will be more likely to sell 
their units at time t. 
 Besides purchases and sales, there are other behavioural patterns in the 
market that could be explained by emotions. The decision to submit offers to buy or to 
sell might also depend on the emotional state of traders. It seems reasonable to believe 
that if traders base their trading decisions at least partly on emotions, more neutrality 
on the part of traders would lead them to be less active in the market. That is to say, 
more emotional agents will intervene more by submitting offers to sell or offers to buy. 
Our second hypothesis, therefore, would be that this pattern would appear in the 
individual level data. 
Hypothesis 2: More neutral individuals at time t-1 are less active in the market, in that 
they submit less offers at time t. 
 An interesting pattern was found in chapter 1 when matching individuals´ 
characteristics and their trading strategies, and it is that a higher CRT score was 
positively correlated with the fundamental value trader type and negatively correlated 
with momentum type. This, as we already mentioned, seems to be in line with the 
argument that more sophisticated traders are more likely to interpret the future streams 
of dividends as a limit price and therefore act as a fundamental value trader type. We 
further want to investigate if emotions could be playing a different role on traders´ 
behaviour depending on the trader type. We would expect that momentum traders, who 
behave irrationally and earn less money than the other two types, would be more 
influenced by emotions when trading, while fundamental value traders and rational 
speculators would be less swayed by emotions. 
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Hypothesis 3: Momentum traders´ decisions correlate with emotions more than those 
of fundamental value traders or rational speculators.  
 The first three hypotheses we have formulated concern the effect of emotions 
on individual behaviour in terms of sales, purchases or making offers. In turn, decisions 
and their subsequent outcomes have an impact on traders´ emotional state. Therefore 
our fourth hypothesis is about the second part of this process. A very natural intuition 
points to a more positive emotional state when the overall financial position of a trader 
improves. 
Hypothesis 4: A better financial overall position at time t-1 improves the emotional 
state of a trader in the next time t.  
 On the other hand, traders could also have short-term emotional responses to 
specific actions such as buying and selling and the extent to which a purchase or sale 
has been profitable or not. Our fifth hypothesis is therefore about specific actions 
having an immediate effect on emotions. 
Hypothesis 5: A profitable trade at time t-1 has a positive immediate impact on 
emotions at time t. 
 The following two hypotheses consider market level data. We have 
concluded so far in the previous chapter that, at the market level, a more positive initial 
state on the part of traders predicts higher prices and larger bubbles, and that more 
initial fear predicts lower prices and smaller bubbles later in the session. We further 
investigate whether this hypothesis is sustained in a continuous manner, that is to say, if 
happiness consistently enhances higher prices over time or if fear always predicts lower 
prices in the immediate subsequent periods. In the context of the 15 periods the market 
is open, we hypothesize that more fear in one period would predict decreasing average 
prices in the next period, and that more positive emotional state would on average 
predict higher prices in the following periods. 
Hypothesis 6: At the market level, more average fear in one period predicts price 
decreases in the next period; a more positive emotional state predicts price increases 
in the next period. 
 Another dimension of the asset market is the volume of trade. Our next 
hypothesis is about whether an emotional component can be linked to a lower volume 
of trade. Based on the idea that a more positive emotional state makes individuals buy 
more and negative emotions such as fear makes them sell, we expect that, when a 
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market is formed by traders with different emotional profiles, there will be more trades 
concluded.  
Hypothesis 7: Higher variance of the emotional state of traders in a market correlates 
with a higher volume of trade. 
 
4. Results  
 We now evaluate the hypothesis advanced in the previous section. The first 
five hypotheses concerning individual behaviour will be tested using tick-by-tick 
individual level data as we described in section 2. For the last two hypotheses regarding 
market behaviour, a data set, in which each observation is a market period, is used. 
Result 1a: Traders with higher valence at time t-1 make more purchases at time t  
Support for result 1a: In order to determine how emotions affect individual trading 
activity we run a Poisson count regression with subject fixed effects where the 
dependent variable is the number of units a subject has bought or sold during each 10 
seconds interval. Each transaction is considered at the time at which a bid or an ask has 
been accepted. In particular we look at the influence of the past overall emotional state 
controlling for financial position and price level. We find that subjects are more likely 
to make more purchases in the current interval, the higher valence they exhibited in the 
previous interval. Table 2 below shows that introducing the lagged value of purchases 
in Model 1, higher emotional valence Granger-causes purchases
19
. It is also an intuitive 
result that the larger the number of units in inventory, less likely it is for subjects to buy 
more.  
Result 1b: More fearful traders at time t-1 do not sell more units at time t 
Support for result 1b: On the other hand, controlling for the units and cash they had 
and considering how high average prices are compared to fundamentals, we do not find 
a significant effect of the lagged value of fear over current sales, although the sign of 
the coefficient is the expected one as it can be seen in Model 3 and 4 in the table below. 
This could be due to the fact that, according to previous studies, fear has a shorter 
duration and it is more volatile than the rest of the emotions. Therefore, capturing the 
                                                          
19
 The time series of the valence Granger-causes purchases, since the lagged values of the 
independent variable provides statistically significant information about future purchases. 
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causal relationship between this emotion and subsequent trading activity in this case 
might not be possible.  
Table 2: Individual behaviour: trading activity depending on past emotions 
(Poisson count regression with subject fixed effects) 
 Buy t Buy t  Sell t Sell t 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
valence t-1 .237* .238* fear t-1 2.151 2.690 
money t-1 7.29e-06 4.95e-06 money t-1 5.79e-06 6.25e-06 
units t-1 -.021** -.015 units t-1 .050*** .046*** 
P level t-1 -.00007 -.00008 P level t-1 -.00012 -.00012 






















 As a robustness check of these results, and to deep in more in the relationship 
between fear and sales, we run the same models to explain individual trading activity 
but instead of the lagged emotion variable, the current emotional response is used as 
independent variable. The results are displayed in table 3. We find that 
contemporaneous valence has no effect on how many units are bought. However, this is 
not the case for selling activity, where the contemporaneous fear does predict higher 
probability of reducing the number of assets in inventory in a given period.  
 Results presented in table 2 and table 3 show that those individuals with a more 
positive emotional state make more purchases in the next period, though there is no 
contemporaneous effect between these two variables. The opposite effect for fear 
affecting sales is found, which leads us to think that the duration and intensity of the 
emotion is an important factor determining how much individual´ s behaviour is 
affected by it. Therefore positive emotional state has a slow impact on purchases, while 
fear is contemporaneously correlated with sales.  
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Table 3: Individual behaviour: trading activity depending on current emotions 
(Poisson count regression with subject fixed effects) 
 Buy t Buy t  Sell t Sell t 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
valence t -.004 .003 fear t 4.995*** 4.861*** 
money t-1 9.00e-06    6.50e-06    money t-1 3.42e-06    3.87e-06    
units t-1 -.020** -.015 units t-1 .048*** .044*** 
P level t-1 -.00011 -.00011 P level t-1 .00012 -.00012 






















Result 2: More neutral individuals participate less in the market 
Support for result 2:  In this market a trade can be conducted either by accepting 
an offer to sell or an offer to buy, or by submitting an offer to sell or an offer to buy 
which at any point in the current period can be accepted by a trader. We may consider 
in this case an active trader as the one who submits offers to sell and offers to buy, and 
a passive trader who mainly accepts these offers. Being more or less active in the 
market could be determined by many factors. Controlling for the overall financial 
position of an individual and the market prices, we look at the effect of emotions on 
submitting bids and asks. We run a logit model where the dependent variable is the 
number of bids/asks/total number of orders that a subject has made in an interval of 10 
seconds.  
 Table 4 below shows that, at the individual level, more neutrality is associated with 
less initiation of orders, especially fewer bids. This seems to indicate that individuals 
who experience more emotions are more active in the market. Including the lagged 
value of the dependent variable in each model we obtain that neutrality Ganger-causes 
the number of bids and the total number of bids and asks that a trader submits to the 
market.  
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 We now consider a further analysis in order to identify which emotions drive such 
behaviour. In Table 5 the same regressions are run, only in this case the lagged value of 
valence is used as independent variable. We find that more positive emotional state is 
associated with lower activity. The effect is significant for asks and total number of 
offers, so this suggests that the power of valence to predict purchases is driven by a 
tendency for individuals with more positive valence to accept asks submitted by others. 
Table 4: Individual behaviour: Number of bids and asks as a function of 
neutrality and market variables (logit model with subject fixed effects) 
 bids t asks t Bids&asks t 
neutrality t-1 -.247** -.031 -.126* 
money t-1 -.00008*** .00005*** 9.81e-06 
units t-1 -.058*** .054*** .020*** 
price level t-1 -.0002 .0001* -.0001 
bids t-1  .128***   
asks t-1  .097***  
Bids&askst-1   .103*** 











Table 5: Individual behaviour: Number of bids and asks as a function of valence 
and market variables (logit model with subject fixed effects) 
 bids t asks t Bids&asks t 
valence t-1 -.139 -.147* -.138** 
money t-1 -.00008*** .00005*** 9.77e-06 
units t-1 -.058*** .055*** .020*** 
price level t-1 -.0002* .0001 -.0001 
bids t-1  .129***   
asks t-1  .096***  
Bids&askst-1   .103*** 











Result 3: Momentum traders buy more when they are in a more positive 
emotional state, while there is no correlation between emotions and the number of 
purchases and sales of fundamental value traders or rational speculator traders. 
Support for result 3: Following the same criteria as in Chapter 1, we classify 
individuals according to their trading strategies into fundamental value traders, 
momentum traders and rational speculator traders. We find similar proportions of trader 
types as in chapter 1: 40% are fundamental value traders, 34% are momentum traders 
and 26% are rational speculator traders. We then analyse how emotions affect their 
trading behaviour. Table 6 below shows that the momentum types, who are the 
relatively unsophisticated traders because they buy when prices have been going up and 
sell when the trend has been negative, buy more based on a more positive emotional 
state. In previous studies it has been noted that relatively unsophisticated traders tend to 
accept offers made by other traders rather than submitting offers themselves 
(Menshikov and Plott 1998). Our results suggest that it is the momentum traders that 
are accepting other traders ‘offers to sell at high prices during the bubble. In order to 
bring some more evidence to support this result, we compute the total number of 
purchases relative to total number of bids for each type of trader. A higher ratio 
indicates that subjects are less active submitting offers to the market; that is to say, their 
trades are being concluded by accepting other participants´ offers. For rational 
speculators this ratio is 0.49, for fundamental value traders goes up to 0.60 and for 
momentum traders the ratio is 0.72. The ratio of sales relative to asks is not 
significantly different between trader types: 0.45, 0.48 and 0.42 respectively. 
Table 6: Individual behaviour: trading activity depending on past emotions for 




Momentum Trader  
Rational Speculator 
Trader 
Valence t-1 .280 .521** -.025 
Money t-1 .00003 -.00004 -.00007** 
Units t-1 .015 -.119*** -.068*** 
Price level t-1 -.0004* .0007*** 3.15e-06 
















Momentum Trader  
Rational Speculator 
Trader 
Fear t-1 9.018 1.219 12.796 
Money t-1 -.00005* -.00006* .0001*** 
Units t-1 .073*** .025 .077*** 
Price level t-1 .0002 -.0006** .0001 












Result 4: A better overall financial position in terms of current wealth improves 
traders´ emotional state 
Support for result 4: A fixed effects regression in table 7 shows that a more 
favourable balance of cash and units improves traders’ emotional state while higher 
price level has a negative effect on valence. We define the price level as the difference 
between the average price and the fundamental value of the asset at any time. Given the 
emotional state in period t-1, more money and units increase valence in period t, so 
valence is Granger-caused by these two variables.  
 It seems straightforward the fact that money and units are positively related to 
valence since they are an indicator of wealth. Since the prices are always above 
fundamentals over the course of the sessions, the price level variable here is actually a 
measure of mispricing. Our results seem to indicate that higher mispricing lowers 
valence perhaps because traders believe the price trajectory and thus the market value 
of their assets is not sustainable. Their market opportunities will then be reduced 
especially for those who hold many units. This is an interesting finding since our first 
result in this chapter is that traders with higher valence make more purchases. 
Therefore the emotional process underlying the formation of a bubble could be that 
positive emotional state enhances purchases, but as prices increase and traders find 
themselves in a boom, their emotions become less positive. A Spearman correlation test 
significant at 1% sustains that the price level variable is negatively correlated with 
valence (ρ= -.09). 
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Table 7: Individual behaviour: Emotions depending on overall financial position 
(subject fixed effects) 
 Valence t Valence t 
money t-1 2.51e-06*  4.01e-06** 
units t-1 .0013* .0022*** 
P level t-1 -.000044*** -.000087*** 
valence t-1 .480***  









Result 5: Profitable purchases lead to higher valence  
Support for result 5: It is also natural to think that profitable purchases or sales would 
improve traders´ emotional state and that bad decisions regarding trading would entail 
more negative emotions. We find that recent trading activity per se does not have a 
direct effect on emotions. This suggests that emotional state changes relatively slowly 
rather than quickly reacting to individual events. It also suggests that valence is 
primarily influenced by overall market position rather than by individual events. 
Nevertheless, the more profitable a purchase is, the higher is the subsequent 
valence as shown by model 3 in table 8. We define the variable to measure how 
profitable a purchase is as the difference between the fundamental value of the asset 
and the transaction price.  
On the other hand, how profitable a sale has been is measured by the difference 
between the price and the fundamental value of the asset. In this case the relationship is 
negative. This leads to think that it is not the profitability of the sale that affects 
individuals’ valence, but finding himself in a high mispricing situation, which we 




Table 8: Individual behaviour: Emotions depending on recent trading activity 







Model 3  
const -.031*** -.016*** -.005* 
buy t-1 .001 .001 .002 
sell t-1 .004 .003 .002 
valence t-1  .483*** .472*** 
Profit buy t-1   .00002** 















 We now focus on studying the impact of emotions on market variables such as price 
movements and trade volume. 
Result 6: Fear increases the probability of prices decreasing, while the rest of the 
emotions appear to help sustain bubbles 
Support for result 6: We construct a dummy variable to identify the average price 
movement across the 15 periods. The dummy takes value 1 if pt-pt-1 < 0 and 0 
otherwise. We then run a logit model with subject fixed effects using the dummy 
variable as the dependent variable.
20
 Emotions at time t-1 are the independent variables 
in this model. The table 9 below shows that with more fear on the part of the traders, 
prices in the market are more likely to decrease. On the contrary, neutrality, happiness 
                                                          
20
 We test fixed effects vs random effects for this model using the Hausman test (p(chi2)<0) 
and also the test of over identifying restrictions (p=.043) and they both reject the hypothesis 
that RE is consistent. Though if we compare the estimates in Table 9 as it is done by 
Rodriguez and Elo (2002), it seems to be the case that with random effects it is mainly the 
fear coefficient that significantly changes and becomes highly significant, while for some of 
the other coefficients the change is not as pronounced. This indicates that estimates from both 
specifications have some robustness. Rodriguez and Elo (2002) argue that such robustness is 
typically associated with the consistency of estimates. 
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and anger reduce the odds of this happening.
21
 This seems to be in line with Lerner and 
Keltner (2001) findings about withdrawal emotions such as fear being associated with 
higher risk aversion, and approach emotions such as happiness and anger associated 
with risk seeking attitudes. According to this argument, it seems reasonable to think 
that fearful people who tend to be more risk averse would place a lower value on the 
asset and therefore lower prices in the market.  Those who experience approach 
emotions give more value to the lottery the asset represents because of a risk loving 
attitude, leading to increasing prices.  
 Table 9: Market behaviour: Negative price movements depending on emotions: 
Comparison for logit/random/fixed effects models (dependent variable at time t) 
 Logit Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Fear t-1 402.26 354.45** 98.08 
Neutral t-1 -5.34 -6.35** -14.27*** 
Happiness t-1 -5.03 -6.14** -15.19*** 
Anger t-1 -4.46 -5.40* -14.30*** 
Disgust t-1 -4.91 -6.17 -20.25*** 
Sad t-1 -2.16 -2.96 -10.68** 
constant 5.40  6.46**  
Nr. Observations RE :700 
Nr. Observations FE: 546 
 
Result 7: More between-subjects variance of emotion in the market correlates 
with fewer trades  
Support for result 7: With regard to the trading volume in a market, it is plausible to 
think that there would be more trade in a period when valence is more disparate among 
individuals, given that positive emotional state seems to encourage purchasing and fear 
                                                          
21
 It is interesting to mention here that emotions in this case seem to predict price movements’ 
direction but not magnitude. Additional analysis was done to investigate this, but emotions 
don’t appear to have predictive power of how much prices will decrease. More precisely we 
constructed a variable that measured the magnitude of the price decrease as max[pt-pt-1, o] and 
used it as dependent variable in a regression with the lagged values of emotions as 
independent variables. None of the coefficients were significant.  
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makes traders more likely to sell. This would imply that, traders with opposite 
emotional profile would create thicker markets.  
 For each of the 15 periods, we calculate the average valence of all traders in the 
market and the dispersion of the valence across subjects.
22
 Controlling for the average 
emotional state, the regression in table 10 reveals that higher variance of the valence is 
correlated with fewer trades in each period. This is the opposite of our hypothesis 7 and 
it seems to occur mainly because there are fewer bids when there is larger dispersion of 
valence. We have seen already that valence is negative on average across subjects. This 
makes us think that when there is a high dispersion of valence between subjects it is 
due to very negative emotional profiles and more neutral types of traders rather than 
positive ones in the market. Therefore in a group with high dispersion of valence, 
neutral subjects would be passive reflecting that in a lower number of bids and this 
would create fewer trades. On the other hand, less dispersion of valence in a group 
would mean that there are more individuals in a negative emotional state present than 
in the previous situations, and as we already pointed out, stronger emotions are, in 
general, related to more trade. 
 
Table 10: Market behaviour: Total number of trades, bids and asks in the market 
depending on the variance of the valence. 
 
Total number of 
trades 
Total number of bids Total number of asks 
Constant 22.62*** 47.74*** 44.95*** 
Average Valence -71.13*** 57.63 -50.19 








Nr. Observations: 75 
                                                          
22
 A more detailed and in-depth analysis of the trading activity as a function of the emotional state 
could also control for the within period variance of the valence for each subject. This would add a new 
dimension to the model though would also lead to a more challenges in interpreting the results.  On 
the other hand, it seems straightforward that individuals’ resource constrains would also affect their 
trading activity, as it has already been shown in table 4. However, this market level analysis is 
intended to relate the aggregate number of trades in a period with the emotional heterogeneity 
across subjects in a market, whereas their particular resource constrains continuously change during 





In the previous chapter we found a number of patterns that conform to the general 
intuition expected about the connection between emotions and asset prices. Based on 
these findings, in this chapter we go one step further in the analysis of these links. The 
purpose is to explain the underlying interaction process that takes place when emotions 
affect decisions in the market and these have influence over one’s financial position, 
which in turn has an emotional impact on traders. 
  We use tick-by-tick data to establish causal relationships between emotions and 
individual behaviour, and a 15 period dataset to investigate how emotions affect market 
level variables. We find that, at the individual level, positive emotional state causes 
more purchases and fear is related to more sales. Subjects who are more neutral 
participate less in the market submitting less bids and asks. Also there seems to be a 
different effect of emotions if we consider different types of traders separately. In this 
sense we show that momentum traders are influenced by a positive emotional state and 
buy more, while fundamental value traders or rational speculators don’t seem to base 
their decisions on emotions. 
In addition, a better overall financial position has a positive effect on emotions as well 
as a profitable purchase. Recent trading activity itself, as a purchase or a sale, does not 
provoke significant emotional responses.  
At the market level we find support for fear predicting prices decrease in the next 
period, and emotions like happiness and anger helping sustaining a bubble. Also in 
aggregate terms, we find that with more disparate valence among traders and a more 
negative average emotional state, fewer trades take place.  
In light of the results obtained with this micro-level analysis we can infer about the 
emotional process that, to some extent, influences the creation and magnitude of such 
puzzling phenomena as bubbles and crashes in asset markets. Thus, it could be argued 
that more positive emotional state enhances purchases and therefore overpricing, 
especially when there are momentum traders in the market whose actions seem to be 
driven by valence. Also more emotions in general create more activity in a market, in 
particular more bids. These facts contribute to the creation of bubbles which are 
sustained by approach emotions and less risk averse attitudes related to them. Generally 
the larger the bubble is, the lower becomes the valence, and this could be due to the 
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fact that subjects realize that prices and therefore the value of their assets are not 
sustainable. As fear appears in the market, a crash becomes more likely to occur.  


































 Structured products make up a significant part of most developed countries’ financial 
systems. According to the SPA (Structured Products Association) over 180 billion $ 
were invested in the European fund market in 2005, 70 billion $ in the United States 
and almost 50 billion $ in the Asian market. In the last years market trends have 
changed little despite the Great Recession. In 2012, according to the Financial Times, 
the sales of structured products continued on the rise despite warnings of the financial 
regulators about their risks and complexity. 
 Parallel to the growth of structured products in particular, the growth of the mutual 
funds industry over the recent decades highlights the ability of these funds to channel 
investors’ money into the financial markets. Khorana and Servaes (2012) report that 
assets in the mutual fund industry increased by a factor of 200 in the period 1976-2009. 
Moreover, about 45% of the households in the U.S. invest in them, according to ICI 
(2010). Investment in mutual funds is then a widespread activity which also non-
specialized agents undertake. In fact, many citizens invest in guaranteed mutual funds 
under the form of retirement plans. 
 The significant role of mutual funds in most markets has aroused both social and 
academic interest. Within this context, the aim of the present study is to analyze the 
individual demand for structured mutual funds according to varying levels of the 
difference in expected return when compared to a bond, and under different 
information conditions.  
 The demand for mutual funds has been extensively analyzed in the literature 
concerned with evaluating fund efficiency. An example of research on structured 
products demand is Breuer et al. (2007) who successfully explain demand for two of 
them using a modified hedonic framing rule. Behavioral biases have already been 
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found in experimental studies focusing on mutual funds. Annaert et al. (2005) carried 
out an experiment on framing in capital guaranteed funds and observed that investors 
tend to choose in a different way when they are aware of some characteristics of the 
probability distribution of the potential gains/losses. Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011) 
experimentally analyzed the importance of providing accurate information about the 
socially responsible character of a mutual fund in order to help investors express their 
ethical preferences.  
 
 Kliger et al. (2003) also opted for an experimental approach to uncover inconsistency 
with standard Expected Utility Theory in mutual fund investor behavior: investors’ 
tendency to delegate money to a fund increases with performance, even when 
performance is uninformative. Choi et al. (2010) designed an experiment to study the 
“law of one price” in fund investment. They presented the subjects with a menu of four 
funds with the same fundamentals but charged higher fees for the funds presenting 
higher past performances (due to the different launching dates). The authors found that 
people heavily relied on the annualized past return of funds in making fund selection 
decisions, even ignoring the fees in many cases. Similar results were obtained by 
Anufriev et al. (2012) in an experiment in mutual fund choice, but in their case, 
centered on the role of past information and fee structure. They observed that fund 
choice decision is heavily driven by past return, even when this information is 
irrelevant. A very similar bias to this one is also obtained in our experiment for the role 
of information about alternative scenarios. 
  The above-mentioned literature analyzes investor behavior and demand for 
mutual funds and in most cases unpredicted behavior appears, to a great extent related 
to the information available to the investors or to the framing of that information. These 
articles add to a growing body of evidence that individual investors make suboptimal 
asset allocation decisions. The present study proposes a simple experimental design, 
which allows for an analysis of individual investor behavior in structured mutual funds 
according to variables such as expected return and risk (we vary the former while we 
keep the latter constant), and, at the same time, tries to eliminate possible behavioral 
biases such as past performance effect, disclosure of the probability distribution of the 
potential gains/losses effect, or other features that might difficult comparisons: fees, 
non-portfolio services, etc. This approach also allows us to evaluate the effect that the 
structure of the available information has on investor behavior and, consequently, on 
the demand for the funds.  
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  The study was undertaken in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics 
(LEE) at the Universitat Jaume I where a sample of university students made 
investment decisions according to different expected return and information conditions. 
They had to invest a fixed amount either in a bond or in a structured product, which 
secured part of the invested capital and yielded additional benefits if the (simulated) 
stock market experienced a positive evolution. Our results show that information 
available to investors, and particularly the order in which it is presented, generates 
significant biases in their decision making that can have both positive and negative 
effects on their behavior. 
 The chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we outline the design of the 
experiment. In the third section we present our hypotheses. Then, we analyze the 
results obtained in the experiment. After that, the main conclusions drawn are 
presented. 
 
2. The experiment 
2.1. Participants 
 A total of 607 undergraduate students from different majors, mainly business 
administration, engineering and economics, participated in the between-subjects study: 
287 in Treatment 1, 227 in Treatment 2 and 93 in Treatment 3. Subjects were recruited 
using the Orsee System (Greiner, 2004) and none of them participated in more than one 
session. Our experiment consisted of 60 scenarios with the agents having to choose 
between two investment options in each of them: a risk free asset (a bond) and a 
structured mutual fund. Each of the 60 scenarios presented a particular combination of 
the interest rate of the bond on one hand, and the secured and expected additional 
benefits of the fund, on the other hand. 
 The experiments were programmed in PHP and Java and carried out in the 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics (LEE) at Universitat Jaume I in Castellón, 
Spain. In order to give a real value to each of the decisions made using experimental 
units (EU), the equivalence of 1 € = 8,000 EU was introduced. Average earnings were 




2.2. Experimental design and framework 
 The experiment consists of three parts. The first part is the most central to this 
research: subjects make investment decisions in each one of the 60 scenarios. The 
second part of the experiment is a risk aversion test using a lottery task. And finally, in 
the last part of the experiment, subjects fill out a personal questionnaire.
23
 
 For the first part of the experiment, subjects were given specific instructions about 
their tasks, which were also read to them aloud by the experimentalist. The experiment 
was then run for each subject on an individual computer. A screen appeared for each 
scenario and the investor had to choose where to invest her total endowment of 100,000 
EU between two investment alternatives, “A” or “B”.
24
  
 The investment alternative “A” was a fixed return risk-free bond. Equation [1] 
describes the final value of the investment after n periods (Vn,j) for the j scenario as the 
result of reinvesting the initial V0 up to n yearly periods, given a simple rj capitalization. 
In the experiment setting, for each scenario, n is equal to 3 years and V0 is 100,000 EU. 
In Treatment 1, for scenarios going from 1 to 30, this investment yields a 3% annual 
interest which implies within 3 years a 9% appreciation. In order to simplify to the 
maximum the investor’s calculations, the yields were calculated with a simple 
capitalization. Starting with the scenario number 31 up to the 60
th
, the bond yields a 7% 
yearly which implies a 21% rj  in three years (see Table 1).  
 
                                                       [1] 
 
 On the other hand, the alternative “B” was to invest in a structured mutual fund. At 
the end of a three year period this investment fund has a final value as the expression 
[2] shows. The first component represents a guaranteed part of the investment (1+gj) 
which varies from -3% to 12% depending on the scenario. Technically speaking, it is 
when this percentage is positive that we can actually consider the fund a guaranteed 
mutual fund. The second component yields an extra value depending on the positive 
evolution of an index representing the stock market. In each of the scenarios, subjects 
are offered a particular percentage (j) over the appreciation of the stock market (rm). 
                                                          
23
 The experimental instructions and the questionnaire are available upon request to the authors. 
24
 Note that the investors could not divide their endowment, they had to invest it fully in one of the two options 
presented to them. 
Vn, j
A =V0 1+ rj( )
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As equation [2] shows, this component is asymmetric, given that it yields an additional 
benefit in case the stock market appreciates, but does not entail losses when the stock 




                                        [2] 
 
 In Treatment 1, every five scenarios the value of the upside participation j is 
successively: 10, 30, 60, 100 and 110 percent. This structure is repeated twelve times 
throughout the whole session. Table 1 summarizes the values of gj and j parameters in 
each scenario for the fund investment “B” as well as rj for the bond investment “A”. 
Please note that the particular order of the scenarios presented in Table 1 was used in 
Treatments 1 and 3, while in Treatment 2 the exact same scenarios were presented in 













                                                          
25
 Actually, the mutual guaranteed funds are products normally structured by means of investment in bonds which at 
the due date provide the invested capital security, and the payment of an option premium which is bounded to a 
certain stock market evolution gives us the second component. Holmen et al. (2012) experimentally study how 
option-like incentives in asset markets can induce higher prices and more risk taking by agents. 
   mjjBjn rVgVV  ,max, 01 00
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Table 1 
Along the 60 scenarios, the table reports the values of the 3-year return (rj) in [1] for the A investment. For the B 
investment, we report the values of the 3-year return of the guaranteed part, (gj) in [2], and the upside participation 
on the stock market 3-year return of the option part, (j) in [2].  
 




(Structured mutual fund) 
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(+) stock market 3-









the (+) stock 
market 3-year 
return (j) 
1 9% -3% 10% 31 21% -3% 10% 
2 9% -3% 30% 32 21% -3% 30% 
3 9% -3% 60% 33 21% -3% 60% 
4 9% -3% 100% 34 21% -3% 100% 
5 9% -3% 110% 35 21% -3% 110% 
6 9% -1.5% 10% 36 21% -1.5% 10% 
7 9% -1.5% 30% 37 21% -1.5% 30% 
8 9% -1.5% 60% 38 21% -1.5% 60% 
9 9% -1.5% 100% 39 21% -1.5% 100% 
10 9% -1.5% 110% 40 21% -1.5% 110% 
11 9% 0% 10% 41 21% 0% 10% 
12 9% 0% 30% 42 21% 0% 30% 
13 9% 0% 60% 43 21% 0% 60% 
14 9% 0% 100% 44 21% 0% 100% 
15 9% 0% 110% 45 21% 0% 110% 
16 9% 3% 10% 46 21% 6% 10% 
17 9% 3% 30% 47 21% 6% 30% 
18 9% 3% 60% 48 21% 6% 60% 
19 9% 3% 100% 49 21% 6% 100% 
20 9% 3% 110% 50 21% 6% 110% 
21 9% 6% 10% 51 21% 8% 10% 
22 9% 6% 30% 52 21% 8% 30% 
23 9% 6% 60% 53 21% 8% 60% 
24 9% 6% 100% 54 21% 8% 100% 
25 9% 6% 110% 55 21% 8% 110% 
26 9% 7.5% 10% 56 21% 12% 10% 
27 9% 7.5% 30% 57 21% 12% 30% 
28 9% 7.5% 60% 58 21% 12% 60% 
29 9% 7.5% 100% 59 21% 12% 100% 






 As in real financial markets, the value of the stock market evolution rm is not known. 
For this experiment we considered it a random variable with a normal distribution (for 
treatments 1 and 2). Even though any simulated data could have been used, we have 
taken the annualized standard deviation of the Ibex 35 daily return over the three year 
period 2008-2010 and the annualized mean of the daily return over the past 10 years. 
As this mean is positive, the probability of a positive rm is higher than that of a negative 
value, which is something expected from the equity risk premium hypothesis.  
 Subjects were informed about investment in stock markets being a risky investment. 
They were also informed that in the simulated stock market there was a 60% 
probability for the revaluation to be positive and a 40% probability for it to be negative. 
And the standard deviation and a table summarizing the distribution of rm were reported 
in the instructions for Treatments 1 and 2. These values were generated, as we 
explained above, using a normal distribution for the 3-year return with 12.021% mean 
and 46.8% standard deviation parameters. In Treatment 3, in order to determine the 
stock market revaluation, we replaced the computer generated value taken from the 
normal distribution of rm with a simple human made die roll. In particular, a volunteer 
subject casted a 10 sided die offering an equivalent 40% probability of negative 
revaluation and an equal 12% mean expected revaluation to that of the normal. 
 After the 60 scenarios were run and all subjects made their choices, the program 
randomly provided a value for rm (in treatments 1 and 2) drawn from the 
aforementioned normal distribution and converted to 0 in case it was negative. In 
treatment 3 a ten-sided die casted by a volunteer participant determined the stock 
market revaluation after all participants had made their decisions and it was also 
converted to 0 in case it was negative. Immediately afterwards, another participant 
volunteered to cast the dice in order to randomly obtain a value j’ from 1 to 60 which 
selected the scenario that would be paid out in cash in that session
26
. Finally, subjects 
who had decided to invest in option A in the selected scenario received the amount 
corresponding to equation [1] and for those who had chosen investment B, their 
earnings were determined by equation [2] according to the realized value of rm and the 
parameters gj and j for the selected scenario j’.  
                                                          
26
 Two dice were used. One with six faces (1-6) determined the first digit and one with 10 faces (0 to 9) determined 
the second digit. Note that the 6 in the first dice could mean either 0 when accompanied with any value greater than 
0 in the second die, or 6 when the second die showed a 0. 
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 We ran 9 sessions of Treatment 1 in which the scenarios were sequentially presented 
as shown in Table 1(with increasing expected returns for the fund). In Treatment 2, the 
exact same 60 scenarios (combinations of fixed and additional potential benefits of the 
two investment options) were presented in random order, independent for each subject, 
to a new pool of subjects. We ran 5 sessions of Treatment 2. Two other sessions were 
ran under Treatment 3 conditions with the rolling die mechanism for determining the 
stock market revaluation and the same 60 scenarios sequentially presented as in 
Treatment 1. 
 We had three main goals: (1) to observe any changes in the way the capital 
endowment was invested between the risky and the risk free assets when the expected 
return varied. (2) to see if the ordering in which the investment scenarios were 
presented to the participants made a difference in their investment decisions by 
comparing treatments 1 and 2. And finally, (3) to study whether more transparent 
information about the return generation process would influence decision making by 
comparing treatments 1 and 3. 
 In the second part of the experiment, we used a lottery to assess the subjects’ risk 
aversion very similar to the one used by Alfarano et al. (2006). This is a modification 
of a Holt and Laury (2002) lottery test where one of the options is not probabilistic and 
increases sequentially in its fixed value and the other is probabilistic but its expected 
value remains fixed. In this part of the experiment eleven lottery choices are displayed. 
The risky option, which remains available along the eleven scenarios, is to obtain 
48,000 EU or zero EU with 50% probability. The safe option consists of a secure 
payment which ranges from 4,000 UE in the first scenario, to 31,000 UE in the last one. 
After all choices are made, one of the eleven scenarios is randomly chosen
27
 and also 
the 50% probability situation is solved by a volunteer tossing a coin. Then the payment 
to each participant in the risky lottery is determined according to these events. An 
expected rational behavior would be to choose the risky option in the first scenarios 
when the riskless offer is low and afterwards, with higher secured yields, switch to the 
safe option at some point of the decisions chain.
28
 
 Finally, the third part of the experiment consisted of a questionnaire with 
demographic and idiosyncratic data. The first three questions were meant to reveal the 
financial knowledge level of the participant. The following four questions evaluated 
how important investment yields and risks were for the subject and whether they had 
                                                          
27
 This was done by a volunteer participant throwing a 12-sided die. If 12 came up she had to cast the die again. 
28
 The analysis of the data obtained from the risk aversion test is available upon request from the authors. 
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any asymmetric perception in the evaluation of gains and losses. The last four questions 




3. Hypotheses  
 In the mean-variance framework of choice among financial assets, for a given level of 
risk, an asset offering a higher expected return would always be preferred over one 
with a lower expected performance. In our design, the only risk faced by the 
participants concerns the future evolution of the (computer or human generated, 
depending on the treatment) simulated stock market revaluation rm, on which the 
variable part of the structured fund return is based. In this way the underlying risk is 
kept constant for all the guaranteed products within a given treatment. On the other 
hand, the alternative investment possibility is a risk-free bond. In this setting, the binary 
decision of choosing between the two investments should be made in terms of the 
subjectively estimated expected utility of each alternative according to each 
individual’s level of risk aversion. When one of the investment alternatives 
unequivocally increases its expected return with respect to the other without varying its 
risk, it should be more preferred by our investors. This can be expressed as appears in 
our Hypothesis 1: 
 
H.1 Investment in the structured fund is increasing in the difference between the 
expected return of the structured fund and that of the risk free bond. 
 
 We understand that each investor may subjectively attach different utility to the same 
level of expected return. This is due to the fact that not every person is risk-neutral. 
Indeed the experimental literature there is ample evidence that people tend to be risk-
averse even for the relatively small amounts of money they can gain in experiments. As 
the only risk in our experimental design concerns the structured fund, this will be in 
general the least preferred option for the more risk-averse investors, and vice-versa: 
H.2 Risk-averse (loving) participants will invest more in the bond (structured fund). 
 
                                                          
29
 The responses obtained from the questionnaire were not significant in the econometric analysis. 
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 We think that this effect could be so important as to totally nullify the effect of big 
expected return differentials between the investment options, but only for the extremely 
risk-averse or extremely risk-loving individuals. We introduce expected return 
differences up to 30% in the design, which are very big for regular investment 
standards. Besides, we do not expect many subjects to show an extreme degree of risk 
aversion or lovingness. Under these circumstances, the aggregate effect of these few 
subjects’ decisions will in any case be very small. 
H.3 Extremely risk averse participants will not invest in the structured fund even for 
high differences in the expected returns. 
 
 According to Miller (1956) “Everybody knows that there is a finite span of immediate 
memory and that for a lot of different kinds of test materials this span is about seven 
items in length… and there is a span of absolute judgment that can distinguish about 7 
categories.” That is, the ability of people to keep in mind and compare a large set of 
options is limited. In our case we presented each subject with 60 binary choices. In 
Treatment 1 the information was presented sequentially, in cycles with increasing order 
of expected returns, so that it was easy for the subjects to categorize and compare the 
different assets across the scenarios. According to the psychological research on the 
matter, in Treatment 1 and 3, subjects should be able to recall and easily compare at 
least within each group of 5 scenarios with stable fixed returns for both investments 
and increasing index-performance related expected returns. However, in Treatment 2, 
the sequence of scenarios did not follow any logic and what was “stored in memory” 
was a juxtaposition of a steadily increasing number of offers with different expected 
values.  
 
 Malhotra (1982) found that respondents experienced information overload when they 
were presented with 10, 15, 20 or 25 choice alternatives. If the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives held in our case this would not pose any problem, because all 60 
binary choices are independent in our design, in the sense that only one of the scenarios 
was to be selected in the end, and all other 59 choices would be totally irrelevant for 
determining the payment to the particular subject. No matter how attractive or 
unattractive an investment seen in prior scenarios was, that should not have any weight 
in the binary decision being presented in a particular alternative scenario. However, if 
the subject tried to keep in mind all the investment options that were presented to her in 
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order to carry out a global comparison, she would soon be confronted to her memory 
and judgment limits.  
H.4 The order in which information is presented to our participants (sequential vs. 
random) will generate biases in their decisions related to information processing 
limitations: i) a sequential presentation of better alternatives can introduce return 
chasing, as has been previously observed in the literature, but, on the other hand, and 
thanks to our design, ii) it can make the extremely generous offers seem “too good to 
be true” and thus less chosen.  
 
 Our argument is that the memory and judgment limitations, operating when the 
investment options are presented randomly (T2), are greatly reduced when these are 
sequentially ordered in groups of five choices in which the only difference is the 
increase in the upside market participation (T1 and T3). This increase may make the 
guaranteed option become more attractive in comparison to the bond than what the 
difference in expected returns would justify. However, when the upside market 
participation (which increases from 10% up to 110%) goes above 100% it could appear 
to be “too good to be true”, i.e. the guaranteed investment may seem to be offering too 
much. In this case, subjects could come to doubt the likelihood of a positive stock 
market return stated in the instructions.
30
 
 In order to alleviate this possible fear of some participants, that high stock market 
revaluations could be less likely to be selected by the computer than they should, in the 
third treatment we have replaced the black box draw of the normal distribution 
generated by the computer with a volunteer participant casting a 10 sided die offering 
an equivalent 40% probability of negative revaluation and an equal 12% mean expected 
revaluation to that of the normal. All other characteristics of the treatment are as in T1. 
What we expect is that the more transparent random generation process used in T3 
makes high upside participation investments to be perceived as credible as small upside 
participation ones. 
H.5 Higher transparency in the random generation process followed for obtaining the 
market revaluation (human die roll vs. computer draw) will alleviate the bias of not 
choosing options offering high upside participations.  
 
                                                          
30
 In fact, for a high guarantee, a real firm which could sell this particular fund would lose money in case of a positive 
revalorization of the stock exchange. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Aggregate results on guaranteed mutual funds investment.  
 Figure 1 offers us some graphical evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2. It allows us to 
infer from the subject’s choices that a very reduced number of people are highly risk 
loving or highly risk averse and they stick to their preferred option: the risky or the safe 
one respectively, both in the presence of highly positive or highly negative return 
differentials between the fund and the bond. In fact there are probably more extremely 
risk averse subjects than extremely risk lovers (around 9% and 1% respectively). 
However, most investors (approximately 90%) change their decision in the 
hypothesized way alongside the evolution of the difference in expected returns between 
the two assets following a sigmoid logistic shape.  
Figure 1 
Percentage of investors choosing the structured fund according to its expected return difference with the bond. 
 
 
 Comparing treatments 1 and 2 in Figure 1 we can observe that in Treatment 1, when 
the scenarios are easier to compare (because they were presented in the sequential order 
shown in Table 1), the percentage of people investing in the guaranteed fund is greater 
for most expected return differentials (full dots are normally placed higher than hollow 
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dots). So, investors have a higher preference for the fund when they can easily compare 
the independent scenarios and observe that the fund offers increasingly higher expected 
gains, while the bonds’ remain constant. This is the first casual evidence of our 
Hypothesis 4.i. As for treatment 3, it appears that a more transparent way to generate 
the stock market revaluation consistently results in less investment in the mutual fund 
when the expected return difference is negative and more investment when it is positive 
than in the other two treatments. 
 This observation supports the idea that investors may suffer from a kind of “past 
returns” or “trend” illusion, similar to Chartism, due to which they tend to believe that 
a good history is in some way guarantee of a good future performance, even in totally 
independent realizations as those presented in our experiment. This result is 
complementary to the ones recently obtained by Choi et al. (2010) and Anufriev et al. 
(2012), even though our situation is not identical, given that the offers that we present 
to the investors correspond to alternative worlds that might be realized in the end or 
not, and not to real past performance.  
 This “trend” effect can also be observed numerically in Table 2a. In order to 
statistically support our graphical observations above, we have conducted a battery of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between the distributions of subject’s proportions of 
structured fund choice for different groups of scenarios and we have obtained 
statistically significant evidence that T1 distribution stochastically dominates T2’s for 
the whole sample and for the two 30 scenarios subsamples.
31
 However T3 
stochastically dominates T1, but only for the last 30 scenarios when the fund is 
relatively less attractive. This indicates that with a more transparent random generation 
process subjects decide more in accordance to the expected return difference. The 
observed pattern shows some evidence in favor of our Hypothesis 5, given that when 
the attractiveness of the fund is greater more participants trust to invest in the fund for 
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 Only when we further break down the sample into the 12 cycles of 5 periods we obtain that the difference is 
significant in half of the cycles, very precisely matching what appears in Figure 2. 
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Table 2a 
Proportion of investors that chose the structured fund for different groups of scenarios. 
 All Half (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Scenarios: 1-60 1-30 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 
T1 Average  52.39% 64.64% 52.12% 54.14% 62.22% 67.03% 73.93% 78.39% 
T2 Average 47.23% 58.82% 40.70% 39.20% 60.96% 62.20% 72.07% 77.79% 
T3 Average 53.78% 65.12% 60.86% 53.73% 63.44% 67.52% 70.10% 75.05% 
K-S p-value T1 vs. T2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.846 0.155 0.315 0.400 
K-S p-value T1 vs. T3 0.253 0.094 0.007 0.042 0.284 0.237 0.056 0.096 
         
Scenarios:  31-60 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 
T1 Average  40.13% 21.95% 28.15% 38.67% 42.43% 48.98% 60.62% 
T2 Average  35.65% 20.17% 21.76% 34.44% 35.59% 43.70% 58.23% 
T3 Average  42.43% 23.44% 30.10% 42.15% 48.60% 50.10% 60.21% 
K-S p-value T1 vs. T2  0.003 0.632 0.060 0.449 0.020 0.028 0.542 
K-S p-value T1 vs. T3  0.019 0.187 0.126 0.136 0.048 0.504 0.633 
 
Table 2b 
Median number of scenarios in which agents chose the structured fund and Mann-Whitney test between treatments 
Scenarios: All Half (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 1-60 1-30 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 
T1 Median (287 obs) 33 20 3 3 3 4 4 4 
T2 Median (227 obs) 28 18 2 2 3 3 4 4 
T3 Median (93 obs) 33 19 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Mann-Whitney p-value  0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.4801 0.0207 0.1591 0.2811 
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.5608 0.4707 0.0393 0.4733 0.7787 0.5890 0.0403 0.0451 
         
 Scenarios: 31-60 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 
T1 Median (287 obs)  12 1 1 2 2 3 3 
T2 Median (227 obs)  10 1 1 2 2 2 3 
T3 Median (93 obs)  13 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Mann-Whitney p-value  0.0231 0.7286 0.0209 0.0944 0.0021 0.0134 0.2815 
Mann-Whitney p-value  0.2378 0.1973 0.2768 0.2687 0.0693 0.9978 0.6198 
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 In Table 2b we compare the median number of scenarios in which subjects invested 
in the structured fund (instead of the whole distribution of the proportions of investors), 
obtaining robust results supporting the statistical significance of a positive difference in 
median investment in the guaranteed fund in T1 with respect to T3. The median 
number of scenarios in which subjects selected the guaranteed fund is 33 out of 60 in 
T1, while only in 28 out of 60 in T2. In fact, performing an additional Mann-Whitney 
test we obtain that the probability for a random scenario that a randomly chosen agent 
from T1 has selected the guaranteed fund more often than a randomly chosen agent 
from T2 is 60%. The tests above offer evidence consistent with our Hypothesis 4.i, 
confirming the existence of a “trend” effect. We observe no significant differences 
regarding the “trend” effect between T1 and T3, as expected. 
 If we analyze Figure 2, which describes the evolution along the scenarios of the 
percentage of investment in the structured fund, behavioral paths can be identified.  
 
Figure 2 




















































 The guaranteed return of the mutual fund is -3% in the first group of 5 periods, while 
the bond ensures a 9% return on the investment for the same time horizon. In the first 
period, with an additional 10% yield over the stock market revaluation for the mutual 
fund, only 18% of the participants prefer the risky option, which seems to indicate that 
a maximum 12% loss is compensated for them by a highly positive expectation on the 
evolution of the stock market. In Treatment 1, within this first group of five scenarios 
there is a maximum investment in the Fund option in the third scenario where a 78.9% 
of participants decide that a 12% maximum loss is compensated by a 60% upside 




 scenario we observe a fall in the mutual fund 
investment: 77.5% and 71.8% of investors decide to invest in the fund for a j value of 
100% and 110% respectively. This pattern is not infrequent in Treatment 1: in the 
second group of five scenarios a similar phenomenon is also observed, that is, mutual 
fund investment rises from 21.1% in the first scenario up to 85% in the 4
th
 scenario 
where it reaches the maximum and finally in the fifth scenario, when the j value goes 
beyond 100%, investment in the fund drops to 79%. This extreme concavity feature is 
repeated throughout the whole of Treatment 1, especially in the scenarios 1 to 30 where 
the difference between the guaranteed three years return of the bond and the guaranteed 
part of the mutual fund is narrower than it is for the last 30.  
 This is in our opinion the most original result of this experiment. While one would 
expect a monotonic increase in investment in each 5 scenarios cycle together with the 
increase in the upside participation, we observe that for percentages higher than 100% 
investment in the structured product in fact nearly always decreases in Treatment 1. We 
call this finding the “too good to be true” effect, which has some implications for the 
advertisement of structured products. Offering such high upside participations could in 
effect be conveying to the risk averse investor the idea that the event of the stock 
market actually revaluating is highly unlikely, because otherwise such great upside 
participation would not be offered. In our experimental case, students may doubt 
whether in the scenarios where the offer is so high the actual probability of a positive 
revaluation really is 60% as stated in the instructions. 
 However still in Figure 2, we can also observe that the “too good to be true” effect 
totally disappears as soon as the subjects are no longer able to easily compare all the 
possible investments. In T2, just more of them invest in the fund when the upside 
participation is 110% than 100%. Seeing all the binary options in random order seems 
not to make them behave more cautiously for extremely high offers. Also introducing a 
more transparent way of generating the stock market revaluation in T3 dramatically 
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reduces the “too good to be true effect”, as stated in our H5. Also the percentages of 
investment in the fund with medium to high upside participation are much bigger than 
in the other two treatments. 
 In order to provide statistical evidence for the “too good to be true” effect we have 
conducted a McNemar symmetry test. This test compares whether the number of times 
that an agent was choosing the guaranteed fund when j was 100% and he decided to 
switch his selection to the bond when j increased to 110% is significantly different 
from the opposite switch, that is, that an agent was choosing the bond when j was 
100% and decided to change to the fund for 110%. Our results can be found in Table 3. 
For the first 30 scenarios of treatment 1 we find that significantly more times the case 
was that those choosing the fund switched to the bond, thus statistically supporting the 
“too good to be true” effect. For the last 30 scenarios of T1 there is no significant 
decrease in fund investment, but also no significant increase -still consistent with our 
hypothesized effect-, while for both the 30 first and the 30 last scenarios of T2 we 
observe the opposite phenomenon: that significantly more people switched from the 
bond to the fund when the upside market participation increased over 100%, as 
expected if no “too good to be true” effect applies and investors just follow the guide of 
the expected return difference. These tests together support our Hypothesis 4.ii that a 
“too good to be true” effect arises when the relatively better and worse investment 
scenarios are made easier to compare. 
 In T3 we obtain that there is no significant decrease in the number of participants 
investing in the fund when the upside participation gets very high for the first 30 
scenarios and actually that there is a significant increase in the last 30 scenarios, thus 
confirming our Hypothesis 5 that transparency about the market revaluation random 










Number of observations choosing the fund for a 100% upside participation switching to the bond for 110% versus 
number of observations choosing the bond for 100% upside participation switching to the fund for 110% 
 
Scenarios: 1st Half 2nd Half 
 1-30 31-60 
T1 (1722 obs) 142 vs. 105 110 vs. 138 
McNemar p-value (-) 0.0218 (=) 0.0862 
T2 (1362 obs) 121 vs. 196 138 vs. 257 
McNemar p-value (+) 0.0000 (+) 0.0000 
T3 (55 obs) 23 vs. 28 20 vs. 54 
McNemar p-value (=) 0.5758 (+) 0.0001 
   
     +/- Stands for an increase/decrease in the  
relative fund purchases when the upside  
market participation increases from 100% to 110% 
 
 That is, in T2, when subjects see the 100% and 110% upside participations in random 
order mixed with the other lower ones (without observing the sequential increase in 
each 5 scenario group) they do not infer any negative signal in such attractive offers. 
Thus, spotting “nearly incredible” offers becomes harder when comparing offers 
becomes cognitively harder. This fact has implications for financial regulatory 
authorities. Clearly organizing and categorizing existing investment opportunities could 
help investors in discriminating reasonable offers from highly unlikely to be fulfilled 
ones. Also exposing dark spots in the information about how the returns are generated 
can help the investor to trust less a given offer (e.g. a Ponzi scheme). 
 Figure 3 shows the expected return differences between the fund and the bond for 
each scenario. In this way they can be used as a benchmark for rational risk neutral 
decision makers. As our participants varied in their degree of risk-aversion we never 
observe that all investors follow the clear-cut risk neutral prediction. However, we do 
observe that the percentage of investors choosing the fund approximately follows the 
difference between the expected return of the fund and the bond, as proposed by 
Hypothesis 1. This link is clearly broken only for Treatment 1, in the scenarios where 




Difference in expected returns between the guaranteed fund and the bond for each scenario 




4.2 Econometric analysis.  
 In this section we further analyze the statistical significance of our results using panel 
regression methodology. In order to obtain a more precise measure of the impact of the 
guarantee and the stock market upside participation on the demand for the mutual fund 
investment we construct a model using as independent variables those appearing in 
equations [1] and [2]: the guaranteed return of the bond (rj), the guaranteed return of 
the structured fund (gj), and the upside participation offered by the fund (j). We have 
also introduced in the analysis the individual level of risk aversion estimated from our 
lottery tests (the higher the value the less risk aversion a subject showed in the test). 
Besides, we also employ as a variable the squared term of the upside participation (j
 2
) 
with the aim of capturing, when this quadratic effect is significant, the concavity of the 
demand of the mutual fund. This concavity must be big for the “too good to be true” 
effect to be significant. 
 The obtained data form a panel with 607 individual decisions across 60 periods (287 
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around 10% investors with non robust answers to the risk aversion test, the respective 
observations were eliminated from our analysis and we remained with a still relatively 
large sample of 542 robust individuals (262 for T1, 205 for T2 and 75 for T3) and a 
total of 32,520 usable observations for our panel data analysis.  
 Table 4a (Panel A) contains the main results that we obtain by running a probit model 
for Treatment 1 in the first column, for Treatment 2 in the second column, and finally 
for the difference between the parameters estimated for the two treatments in the third 
column. Starting with Treatment 1, all variables turn out to be highly significant and 
they all have the expected sign. For example, an increase of the return (rj) of option A 
(the bond) has a negative effect on the mutual fund demand, while a higher guaranteed 
value (gj) of option B (the fund) increases its demand. Also positively, but in a lower 
proportion, the upside participation (j) increases the mutual fund demand. All these 
three significant results together statistically confirm our Hypothesis 1. The negative 
coefficient of the squared term of the aforementioned upside participation confirms our 
preliminary graphical analysis, which indicated a concave shape of the demand for the 
mutual fund as a function of the upside participation. The effects concerning j and j
2
 
deserve a more detailed analysis that we will undergo when we consider the difference 
between both treatments (third column).  
 We also find that in a scale from 1 to 12 of risk attitude (1 is very risk averse and 12 
is highly risk lover), one additional level in this scale, that is, being characterized as 
more risk lover, entails a significantly higher probability of choosing the structured 
fund. This confirms our Hypothesis 2 that those subjects relatively less risk-averse 
invest with higher probability in the risky option. 
 
 When we turn to treatment 2 (second column) we observe that all the mentioned 
significant effects are robust, but they are smaller, with the exception of the effect of 
the guaranteed return of the fund. But, are these differences in the size of the 
coefficients significant? In the third column we check for the significance of the 
differences between the coefficients estimated for the two treatments and we obtain that 
those for the bond returns, risk aversion and also the intercept are not significantly 
different between treatments. The positive effect of the guaranteed return of the fund is 
slightly greater in T2. This is true particularly in the first 30 scenarios when the bond 
return is relatively low, as we can observe in Panels 4B and 4C. In those panels we 
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separate the sample into the observations of the first 30 and the last 30 scenarios (when 
ordered as in Table 1).  
 And the most important differences between the two treatments (third column of 
Panel 4A) are, firstly, that the positive effect of the upside participation on fund 
demand is significantly reduced to two thirds in Treatment 2 when the investment 
options are made harder to compare, thus econometrically confirming the “trend” 
effect, and secondly, that the concavity of the demand function with respect to this 
upside participation is also significantly halved for T2, dramatically reducing the “too 
good to be true” effect (these results are robust for all scenarios as we can observe in 


















Table 4a: Treatment Comparison T1 vs T2 
Panel Probit Model for the probability of an investor choosing the structured mutual fund 
 Panel A (All Scenarios) Panel B (Scenarios 1-30) Panel C (Scenarios 31-60) 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Difference  (T2-T1) Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Difference  (T2-T1) Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Difference(T2-T1) 
guaranteed A (rj) -0.090*** -0.085*** 0.005       
 (0.0021) (0.0023)         (0.0032)       
guaranteed B (gj) 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.008** 0.105*** 0.130*** 0.025*** 0.093*** 0.088*** -0.004 
 (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0050) 
upside percent. (j)   0.043*** 0.028*** -0.013*** 0.053*** 0.034*** -0.018***      0.038*** 0.026*** -0.011***      
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0037) 
j
 2 -0.00022*** -0.0001*** 0.00012*** -0.00032*** -0.00014*** 0.00017***    -0.00015*** -0.00007*** 0.00008***    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
risk lover        0.129*** 0.087*** -0.041 0.134*** 0.098*** -0.035 0.127*** 0.079*** -0.045 
 (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0253) (0.0169) (0.0197) (0.0272) (0.0194) (0.0212) (0.0312) 
constant -1.275*** -1.041*** 0.227 -2.235*** -2.020*** 0.196 -3.281*** -2.786*** 0.452 
 (0.1345) (0.1577) (0.2179) (0.1469) (0.1739) (0.2367) (0.1735) (0.1915) (0.2765) 
N. Observations 15720 12300 28020 7860 6150 14010 7860 6150 14010 
N. Subjects 262 205 467 262 205 467 262 205 467 
Wald Chi 2 3775.65*** 3037.99*** 6818.28*** 1461.31*** 1339.07*** 2808.35*** 1750.80*** 1297.65*** 3050.7*** 
(std. error),  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 4b: Treatment Comparison T1 vs T3 
Panel Probit Model for the probability of an investor choosing the structured mutual fund 
 Panel D (All Scenarios) Panel E (Scenarios 1-30) Panel F (Scenarios 31-60) 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Difference (T3-T1) Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Difference (T3-T1) Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Difference(T3-T1) 
guaranteed A (rj) -0.090*** -0.124*** -0.034***       
 (0.0021) (0.0052)         (0.0056)       
guaranteed B (gj) 0.091*** 0.111*** 0.020*** 0.105*** 0.097*** -0.008 0.093*** 0.129*** -0.036*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0047) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0088) 
upside percent. (j)   0.043*** 0.046*** 0.0041 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.002    0.038*** 0.041*** 0.002     
 (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0024) (0.0057) (0.0062) 
j
 2 -0.00022*** -0.00009*** 0.00012*** -0.00032*** -0.00017*** 0.00014***    -0.00015*** -0.00002 0.00013***    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
risk lover        0.129*** 0.038** -0.168*** 0.134*** -0.045** -0.180*** 0.127*** 0.036 -0.167*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0267) (0.0169) (0.0212) (0.0289) (0.0194) (0.0242) (0.0341) 
constant -1.275*** -0.390** 0.890*** -2.235*** -1.585*** 0.644*** -3.281*** -3.121*** 0.157 
 (0.1345) (0.1637) (0.2242) (0.1469) (0.1807) (0.2430) (0.1735) (0.2426) (0.3132) 
N. Observations 15720 4500 20220 7860 2250 10110 7860 2250 10110 
N. Subjects 262 75 337 262 75 337 262 75 337 
Wald Chi 2 3775.65*** 1444.18*** 5235.45*** 1461.31*** 698.25*** 2181.66*** 1750.80*** 693.47*** 2460.19*** 




Table 4b (Panel D) shows the outcome of a probit regression for Treatment 1 in the first 
column, for Treatment 3 in the second column, and finally for the difference between the 
parameters estimated for the two treatments in the third column. Again, as for T1 and T2, 
all variables turn out to be highly significant and they all have the expected sign. There are 
only some significant differences between T3 and T1 that can be found in column 3. The 
increase of the return (rj) of option A (the bond) has a more negative effect on the mutual 
fund demand in T1 than in T3, while consistently a higher guaranteed value (gj) of option B 
(the fund) increases its demand more in T3 than in T1. Also the constant is a bit less 
negative reflecting a general higher tendency to invest in the fund in T3. All these three 
differences indicate us that risky funds are more preferred to the safe bond when the 
underlying randomness generating process is more transparent. The upside participation 
shows much lower concavity in T3 than in T1, approximately the same than in T2, 
confirming a big reduction of the “too good to be true” effect with higher transparency as 
Hypothesis 5 proposed. On the other hand, no differences are found in the effect of the 
upside market participation, that is, the “trend” effect, which is equally present in both 
“ordered” treatments. Risk aversion, as expected, plays a much less fundamental role in T3 
with coefficients much closer to zero than in the other two treatments. Observing panels 4E 
and 4F we see that separating the sample into the two 30 period subsamples does not 
fundamentally change the results.  
 In order to try to disentangle the effect of risk aversion in the “too good to be true” effect 
we have run a Spearman correlation analysis which we present in Table 5. We have shown 
above that the exact order in which the sequence of upside participations is displayed 
encourages the trend phenomenon to appear in the treatment with an easier comparison. 
But still, this would not explain why investment is reduced and not increased for the 
highest offers. Our hypothesis 3 was that the highly risk-averse subjects will not invest in 
the mutual fund even for highly favorable expected return differentials. When the upside 
participation increases highly, the fund’s expected return will increase accordingly. But 
when comparing the options becomes easier, subjects can more easily come to believe that 
a positive revaluation is more unlikely when they are being offered a relatively high upside 
participation, and therefore they perceive higher risk if they do not completely trust the 
computer generated random draw used in T1. It will be fundamentally the more risk-averse 
who will not want to invest in the fund under these circumstances. 
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 Given that the “too good to be true” effect appears in the last period of every 5 periods 
cycle, that is, when the premium goes from 100% to 110%, we analyze investors behavior 
in this scenario interval identifying the ones who choose to invest in the mutual fund when 
they are offered a 100% over the stock market revaluation and switch to the safe bond 
investment option when the upside participation increases to 110%.  
 
 For Treatment 1 a highly significant negative correlation is observed between the risk 
loving variable and the frequency with which a subject switches from the mutual fund to 
the safe option in every fifth period. Thus, a more risk averse attitude is positively 
correlated with the “too good to be true” effect (see Table 5). 
 There is no significant correlation in Treatment 2 though, this result being in concordance 
with our Hypothesis 4, in the sense that the difficulty of comparing the offers makes it 
harder for our subjects’ minds to spot the extremely high offers and assign them a higher 
risk. Also there is no significant correlation in Treatment 3, consistent with the our 
Hypothesis 5 that increased transparency makes subjects trust all offers equally whether 
more or less risk averse. 
Table 5.  









Treatment 1 -0.2012*** -0.1269** -0.2002*** 
 (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) 
Treatment 2 -0.0547 -0.1142 -0.0982 
 (0.436) (0.102)* (0.161) 
Treatment 3 -0.1671 -0.0526 -0.1519 
 (0.124) (0.630) (0.162) 






 In this study we experimentally analyze the demand for structured products; in 
particular we construct a guaranteed mutual fund that is offered to participant-investors as 
an alternative to a risk-free bond. Our experimental design allowed us to control for the 
effect of several variables such as guarantees, upside participation, risk aversion, and the 
informational structure. We obtain that, apart from the expected rational behavior of 
participants, consistent with the expected value framework, some behavioral biases arise in 
Treatment 1, where the investment products are shown sequentially ordered in a way that 
they can easily be categorized and compared. 
 One of the behavioral biases observed is a “trend” effect which causes investors 
to value more positively the structured investment fund when they observe an increase in 
the expected returns that it offers, even if the final realization of the returns of a given 
scenario is totally independent of the other scenarios. This illusion is similar to other well 
known behavioral biases in the literature such as the “illusion of past returns”. We believe 
this can only be fought by the regulator with greater financial literacy and an insistence that 
past returns are not a guarantee of future returns. 
 Another behavioral bias, first documented here, is what we call the “too good to 
be true” effect. This refers to participants not investing in extremely high yields 
opportunities that seem hard to believe. This appears to be a consequence of investors 
being able to more easily compare the different investment alternatives, thus altering their 
perceived risk, as it disappears when we present the investment scenarios in random order 
in T2. Also, a modification of the design in T3, which makes transparent to the subjects the 
generation of the random market revaluation, keeping the perceived risk constant for all 
upside participations, results in the “too good to be true” effect being greatly reduced, 
without the need of presenting the scenarios in random order.  
 A policy implication of our main experimental finding would call for increasing 
the availability of directly comparable investments that the investors could study before 
placing their money. Regulation in the structured funds industry should control the way 
this information is presented to investors to prevent financial advisers exploiting behavioral 
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biases in order to favor their own products. Simplifying the investors’ information 
processing load could reduce the probability of their getting lured into dubious 
investments. Besides, exposing dark spots in the information about how the returns will be 
generated can importantly help the investor to identify unreasonable offers (e.g. a Ponzi 
scheme). 
 
 Future research could explore the effectiveness of offering all information 
ordered, categorized and clearly explained beforehand in fighting the trend bias while at 
the same time discouraging the “too good to be true” bias by transparently generating the 
random market revalorization. Also, exploring whether introducing a decreasing expected 
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Appendix Chapter 1:   
Appendix 1.I:  histograms of the distributions of Loss Aversion, Risk Aversion and 































Appendix 1.II:  Instructions Decreasing Fundamental Value Treatment:   
General Instructions 
 
Welcome to this experiment. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you 
in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
The session will be divided in four parts and you will have the opportunity to earn money in each 




In the first part of the experiment six bets will be presented to you. Each bet gives you a 50-50 
chance of winning some money or losing some money.  
 
For each bet, you must decide if you want to play it or not, although only one randomly chosen 
decision will count toward your earnings.  
 
After all participants have made their decisions for each of the six bets, the experimenter will roll 
a six-sided die. The outcome of the roll will determine the one single bet that will count to 
determine your earnings. If the die reads 1, you will be paid for your decision in the first lottery. 
If the die reads 2, you will be paid for your decision in the second lottery, and so on. Exactly one 
of the six bets will count. 
 
After the die is rolled, if you decided not to play the bet chosen by the die roll, your earnings will 
be 0 euros for this part of the experiment.  
 
If you decided to play that bet chosen by the die roll, there will be a 50-50 chance for you to win 
or lose the amount of money indicated in the bet. Then, the experimenter will toss a coin. If the 
coin comes up heads you lose and if the coin comes up tails you win the amount of money 
specified in the lottery. 
 
 
          Lottery (50-50 chance)             Accept to play? 
Lose 0.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 1.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 2.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 3.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 4.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 5.5€ or win 4.5€ 





In this part of the experiment, you will have to answer three questions. You will have exactly 3 
minutes to answer the questions. Each correct answer will earn you 1 euro. That is, if you give 
one correct answer, you get 1 euro; if you give two correct answers you get 2 euros and if you 





In this part of the experiment you will be making choices between two lotteries, such as those 
represented as "Option A" and "Option B" below. The money prizes are determined by the 
computer equivalent of throwing a ten-sided die. Each outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is 
equally likely. If you choose Option A in the row shown below, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of 
earning 2.00€ and a 9 in 10 chance of earning 1.60€. Similarly, Option B offers a 1 in 10 chance 





Option A: 2.00€ if the die is 1 and 1.60€ if the die is 2 - 10 
Option B: 3.85€ if the die is 1 and 0.10€ if the die is 2 – 10 
 
Each box of the decision table contains a pair of choices between Option A and Option B. You 
make your choice by clicking on the "A" or "B" buttons on the bottom. Only one option in each 
box can be selected, and you may change your decision as you wish. 
Note: try clicking on one of the radio buttons, then change by clicking on the other one. 
 
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up being used. The selection 
of the one to be used depends on the "throw of the die" that is the determined by the computer's 
random number generator. No decision is any more likely to be used than any other, and you will 
not know in advance which one will be selected, so please think about each one carefully.  
For example, suppose that you make all ten decisions and the roll of the die is 9, then your choice, 
A or B, for decision 9 would be used and the other decisions would not be used. 
 
After the random die throw determines the decision box that will be used, we need to obtain a 
second random number that determines the earnings for the option you chose for that box. In 
Decision 9 below, for example, a throw of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 will result in the higher payoff 
for the option you chose, and a throw of 10 will result in the lower payoff. 
 
9th: 
Option A: 2.00€ if the die is 1-9 and 1.60€ if the die is 10 




For decision 10, the random die throw will not be needed, since the choice is between amounts of 
money that are fixed: 2.00€ for Option A and 3.85€ for Option B. 
 




In this part of the experiment you will make decisions in a market. There will be a sequence of 
trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares in a market. The 
currency used in this market is ECU. All trading will be in terms of ECU. The cash payment to 
you at the end of the experiment will be in Euros. The conversion rate is 500 ECU to 1 Euro. 
 
 
1. How to use the computerized market 
 
On the top right corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current period. The 
goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the left side of your screen 
you see the current period, the number of Shares you currently have and the amount of Money, in 
ECU, you have available to buy Shares. 
 
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell:” in the 
second column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a Share, 
and then select “Submit Offer To Sell”. Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate 
space, and then click on the field labelled “Submit Offer To Sell”. You will notice that nine 
numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the second column on the left, entitled 
“Offers To Sell”. Your offer is listed in blue. Submitting a second offer will replace your previous 
offer. 
 
The lowest offer-to-sell price will always be on the top of that list and will, by default, be 
selected. You can select a different offer by clicking on it. It will then be highlighted. If you 
select “Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the currently 
selected sell price. Please purchase a share now by selecting “Buy” button. Since each of you had 
offered to sell a share and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you will all have the 
same number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one 
share. Please note that if you have an offer selected and the offer gets changed, it will become 
deselected if the offer became worse for you. If the offer gets better, it will remain selected. 
 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a 
share, your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by 
selecting “Submit offer to buy”. Please do so now. Type a number in the text area“Enter offer to 
buy, then press the red button labelled “Submit Offer to buy”. You can replace your offer-to-buy 
by submitting a new offer. You can accept any of the offers-to-buy by selecting the offer and then 




In the middle column, labelled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which Shares have 
been bought and sold in this period. You will now have 5 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a 
practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not 
influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is to master 
the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully submitted offers to buy and 
offers to sell. Also be sure that you have accepted to buy and sell others. You are free to ask 
questions during the practice period by raising your hand. 
 
2. Specific Instructions for this experiment 
 
 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 
2 minutes, during which you are permitted to buy and sell shares. Shares have life of 15 periods. 
Your inventory of shares carries over from one period to the next. For example, if you have 5 
shares at the end of period 1, you will have 5 shares at the beginning of period 2. 
 
You start period 1 with 10 shares in your inventory and 3600 ECU of Money balance, which you 




You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading 
periods. At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the experimenter will flip a coin, 
which will determine the dividend for that period.  
 
Each period, each share you hold at the end of the period earns you a dividend of: 
 
10 ECU if the coin comes up heads 
-10 ECU if the coin comes up tails 
 
Both sides of the coin are equally likely, which means that the average dividend is 0. We arrive at 
0 by averaging the two equally likely dividends: 10, -10. That is, we calculate (10-10)/2=0. 
 
If the dividend of the period is 10, you earn 10 ECU for each share you own, and that money will 
be automatically added to your Money balance at the end of the period. If the dividend of the 
period is -10, for each share you own there will be 10 ECU subtracted from your Money balance 
at the end of the period. 
 
Subsidies: At the end of each of the last eight periods, you will obtain a payment of 10 ECU for 
each share in your inventory. This payment is called a subsidy. The subsidy is paid to you at the 
end of period 8, period 9, ..., and period 15. No subsidy is paid at the end of the first seven 




The subsidies that you receive are automatically added to your money balance at the end of each 
of the last eight periods. 
 
Final Buyout: At the end of period 15, after the dividends and subsidies have been paid out for the 
period, the experimenter will purchase back all the shares in the market for 40 ECU each from 
their current owners. This buyout value will be added to any dividends and subsidies received in 
period 15. 
 
3. Average Holding Value Table 
You can use the AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of this document) 
to help you make decisions. It calculates the average amount of dividends and holding taxes you 
will receive and pay if you keep a share until the end of the experiment. It also describes how to 
calculate how much in future dividends and holding taxes you give up on average when you sell a 
share at any time. The columns in the table contain the following information: 
 
1. Current Period: the period during which the average holding is being calculated. For example, in 
period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are in effect. 
2. Number of Remaining Dividends: the number of times that a dividend can be received from the 
current period until the final period. This is the remaining number of times the experimenter will 
toss the coin. It is calculated by taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current 
period number, and adding 1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period. 
3. Average Dividend: the average amount of each dividend. As we indicated earlier, the average 
dividend in each period is 0 per share in each period.  
4. Final buyout Value: The payment you receive for each share you hold at the end of period 15.  
5. 5. Number of Remaining Subsidy Payments: the number of times that a subsidy will be paid on a 
share from the current period until the end of the experiment. It is calculated by taking the total 
number of subsidies periods, 8, and subtracting the number of subsidies periods that have already 
passed. 
6. Subsidy Amount per period: the amount that the subsidy payment per share will be in the current 
period. As indicated earlier, there is no subsidy in the first 7 periods, while the subsidy amount is 
10 ECU per share in the last 8 periods. 
7. Total Remaining Subsidies: the total value of the subsidies remaining on a share from now until 
the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of 
the experiment, you will be paid the amount listed in column 7 in holding subsidies. It is 
calculated by multiplying Number of Remaining Subsidies Payments by Subsidy Amount. 
8. Average Holding Value: the average value of holding a share for the remainder of the experiment. 
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, the net 
value of the dividends you earn, the subsidies you will be paid and the buyout value you receive 
will on average be the amount listed here. It is calculated by summing up Remaining Subsidies, 









4. Your Earnings 
 
Your earnings in this part of the experiment will equal the total amount of money that you have at 
the end of period 15. More specifically, your earnings will be: 
 
the money you begin with 
+any dividends you receive 
+any subsidies you receive 
+any money you receive from sales of shares 
-any money you spend on purchases of shares 
+ the final buyout value for the units you have at the end of period 15 
Please have a look at this table now and make sure you understand it. Feel free to raise your hand 






1. Suppose it is period 10. How much will you get paid in total in subsidies on a share if you hold it 





2. Suppose it is period 10. How much do you expect to receive in dividends on a share if you hold it 












Beginning the experiment. From now on your decisions will count toward your earnings, so 





























1 15 0 40 8 0 80 120 
2 14 0 40 8 0 80 120 
3 13 0 40 8 0 80 120 
4 12 0 40 8 0 80 120 
5 11 0 40 8 0 80 120 
6 10 0 40 8 0 80 120 
7 9 0 40 8 0 80 120 
8 8 0 40 8 10 80 120 
9 7 0 40 7 10 70 110 
10 6 0 40 6 10 60 100 
11 5 0 40 5 10 50 90 
12 4 0 40 4 10 40 80 
13 3 0 40 3 10 30 70 
14 2 0 40 2 10 20 60 















Welcome to this experiment. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you 
in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
The session will be divided in four parts and you will have the opportunity to earn money in each 




In the first part of the experiment six bets will be presented to you. Each bet gives you a 50-50 
chance of winning some money or losing some money.  
 
For each bet, you must decide if you want to play it or not, although only one randomly chosen 
decision will count toward your earnings.  
 
After all participants have made their decisions for each of the six bets, the experimenter will roll 
a six-sided die. The outcome of the roll will determine the one single bet that will count to 
determine your earnings. If the die reads 1, you will be paid for your decision in the first lottery. 
If the die reads 2, you will be paid for your decision in the second lottery, and so on. Exactly one 
of the six bets will count. 
 
After the die is rolled, if you decided not to play the bet chosen by the die roll, your earnings will 
be 0 euros for this part of the experiment.  
 
If you decided to play that bet chosen by the die roll, there will be a 50-50 chance for you to win 
or lose the amount of money indicated in the bet. Then, the experimenter will toss a coin. If the 
coin comes up heads you lose and if the coin comes up tails you win the amount of money 




          Lottery (50-50 chance)             Accept to play? 
Lose 0.5€ or win 4.5€ o Yes o No 
Lose 1.5€ or win 4.5€ o Yes o No 
Lose 2.5€ or win 4.5€ o Yes o No 
Lose 3.5€ or win 4.5€ o Yes o No 
Lose 4.5€ or win 4.5€ o Yes o No 









In this part of the experiment, you will have to answer three questions. You will have exactly 3 
minutes to answer the questions. Each correct answer will earn you 1 euro. That is, if you give 
one correct answer, you get 1 euro; if you give two correct answers you get 2 euros and if you 





In this part of the experiment you will be making choices between two lotteries, such as those 
represented as "Option A" and "Option B" below. The money prizes are determined by the 
computer equivalent of throwing a ten-sided die. Each outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is 
equally likely. If you choose Option A in the row shown below, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of 
earning 2.00€ and a 9 in 10 chance of earning 1.60€. Similarly, Option B offers a 1 in 10 chance 





Option A: 2.00€ if the die is 1 and 1.60€ if the die is 2 - 10 
Option B: 3.85€ if the die is 1 and 0.10€ if the die is 2 – 10 
 
Each box of the decision table contains a pair of choices between Option A and Option B. You 
make your choice by clicking on the "A" or "B" buttons on the bottom. Only one option in each 
box can be selected, and you may change your decision as you wish. 
Note: try clicking on one of the radio buttons, then change by clicking on the other one. 
 
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up being used. The selection 
of the one to be used depends on the "throw of the die" that is the determined by the computer's 
random number generator. No decision is any more likely to be used than any other, and you will 
not know in advance which one will be selected, so please think about each one carefully.  
 
For example, suppose that you make all ten decisions and the roll of the die is 9, then your choice, 
A or B, for decision 9 would be used and the other decisions would not be used. 
 
After the random die throw determines the decision box that will be used, we need to obtain a 
second random number that determines the earnings for the option you chose for that box. In 
Decision 9 below, for example, a throw of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 will result in the higher payoff 
for the option you chose, and a throw of 10 will result in the lower payoff. 
 
9th: 
Option A: 2.00€ if the die is 1-9 and 1.60€ if the die is 10 
Option B: 3.85€ if the die is 1-9 and 0.10€ if the die is 10 
 
For decision 10, the random die throw will not be needed, since the choice is between amounts of 
money that are fixed: 2.00€ for Option A and 3.85€ for Option B. 
 








In this part of the experiment you will make decisions in a market. There will be a sequence of 
trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares in a market. The 
currency used in this market is ECU. All trading will be in terms of ECU. The cash payment to 
you at the end of the experiment will be in Euros. The conversion rate is 500 ECU to 1 Euro. 
 
 
1. How to use the computerized market 
 
On the top right corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current period. The 
goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. In the center of your screen 
you see the current period and the amount of Money, in ECU, you have available to buy Shares. 
To the left of the screen, you see the number of Shares you currently have. 
 
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell:” in the 
second column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a Share, 
and then select “Submit Offer To Sell”. Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate 
space, and then click on the field labelled “Submit Offer To Sell”. You will notice that nine 
numbers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the third column on the left, entitled 
“Offers To Sell”. The lowest ask price will always be on the bottom of that list and will, by 
default, be selected. You can select a different offer by clicking on it. If you select “Buy”, the 
button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the currently selected sell price. 
 
Please purchase a share now by selecting “Buy”. Since each of you had offered to sell a share and 
attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you will all have the same number of shares you 
started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one share.  
 
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a 
share, your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by 
selecting “Submit offer to buy”. Please do so now.  Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to 
buy”. Then press the red button labelled “Submit Offer to buy”. You can sell to the person who 
submitted the highest offer to buy if you click on “Sell”. Please do so now. 
 
In the middle column, labelled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which Shares have 
been bought and sold in this period. 
 
You will now have 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a practice period. Your actions in 
the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence your position later in 
the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is to master the use of the interface. Please be 
sure that you have successfully submitted offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you 
have accepted to buy and sell others. You are free to ask questions during the practice period by 










2. Specific Instructions for this experiment 
 
 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 
2 minutes, during which you are permitted to buy and sell shares. Shares have life of 15 periods. 
Your inventory of shares carries over from one period to the next. For example, if you have 5 
shares at the end of period 1, you will have 5 shares at the beginning of period 2. 
 
You start period 1 with 10 shares in your inventory and 3600 ECU of Money balance, which you 




You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading 
periods. At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the experimenter will flip a coin, 
which will determine the dividend for that period.  
 
Each period, each share you hold at the end of the period earns you a dividend of: 
 
10 ECU if the coin comes up heads 
-10 ECU if the coin comes up tails 
 
Both sides of the coin are equally likely, which means that the average dividend is 0. We arrive at 
0 by averaging the two equally likely dividends: 10, -10. That is, we calculate (10-10)/2=0. 
 
If the dividend of the period is 10, you earn 10 ECU for each share you own, and that money will 
be automatically added to your Money balance at the end of the period. If the dividend of the 
period is -10, for each share you own there will be 10 ECU subtracted from your Money balance 
at the end of the period. 
 
Taxes: At the end of each of the last eight periods, you must pay a tax of 10 ECU for each share 
you have. That is, a tax is paid at the end of period 8, period 9,…, and period 15. No tax is paid at 
the end of the first seven periods: period 1, period 2,…, and period 7. 
 
The taxes you owe on shares are automatically subtracted from your money balance at the end of 
each of the last eight periods. 
 
Final Buyout: At the end of period 15, after the dividends and taxes have been paid out, the 
experimenter will purchase back all the shares in the market for 200 ECU each from their current 
owners. This buyout value will be added to any dividends received in period 15. 
 
3. Average Holding Value Table 
 
You can use the AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of this document) 
to help you make decisions. It calculates the average amount of dividends and holding taxes you 
will receive and pay if you keep a share until the end of the experiment. It also describes how to 
calculate how much in future dividends and holding taxes you give up on average when you sell a 




1. Current Period: the period during which the average holding is being calculated. For example, in 
period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are in effect. 
2. Number of Remaining Dividends: the number of times that a dividend can be received from the 
current period until the final period. That is, it indicates the remaining number of times the 
experimenter will toss the coin. It is calculated by taking the total number of periods, 15, 
subtracting the current period number, and adding 1, because the dividend is also paid in the 
current period. 
3. Average Dividend: the average amount of each dividend. As we indicated earlier, the average 
dividend in each period is 0 per share in each period.  
4. Final buyout Value: The payment you receive for each share you hold at the end of period 15.  
5. Number of Remaining Tax Payments: the number of times that a tax must be paid on a share from 
the current period until the end of the experiment. It is calculated by taking the total number of 
tax periods, 8, and subtracting the number of tax periods that have already passed. 
6. Tax Amount: the amount that the tax payment per share will be. As indicated earlier, there is no 
tax in the first 7 periods, while the tax amount is 10 ECU per share in the last 8 periods. 
7. Remaining Taxes: the total value of the taxes remaining on a share from now until the end of the 
experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, 
you will pay the amount listed in column 7 in holding taxes. It is calculated by multiplying 
Number of Remaining Tax Payments by Tax Amount. 
8. Average Holding Value: the average value of holding a share for the remainder of the experiment. 
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, the 
difference between the dividends you earn and the taxes you pay will on average be the amount 
listed here. It is calculated by subtracting Remaining Taxes from Average Remaining Dividends. 
 
 
Please have a look at this table now and make sure you understand it. Feel free to raise your hand 





1. Suppose it is period 10. How much will you pay in total in taxes on a share if you hold it for the 





2. Suppose it is period 10. How much do you expect to receive in dividends on a share if you hold it 














4. Your Earnings 
Your earnings in this part of the experiment will equal the total amount of money that you have at 
the end of period 15. More specifically, your earnings will be: 
 
the money you begin with 
+any dividends you receive 
-any taxes you pay 
+any money you receive from sales of shares 
-any money you spend on purchases of shares 
 
Beginning the experiment. From now on your decisions will count toward your earnings, so 




























1 15 0 200 8 0 80 120 
2 14 0 200 8 0 80 120 
3 13 0 200 8 0 80 120 
4 12 0 200 8 0 80 120 
5 11 0 200 8 0 80 120 
6 10 0 200 8 0 80 120 
7 9 0 200 8 0 80 120 
8 8 0 200 8 10 80 120 
9 7 0 200 7 10 70 130 
10 6 0 200 6 10 60 140 
11 5 0 200 5 10 50 150 
12 4 0 200 4 10 40 160 
13 3 0 200 3 10 30 170 
14 2 0 200 2 10 20 180 










Appendix Chapter 2:   
APPENDIX 2.I: Instructions for the Loss Aversion Measurement Task 
 
Welcome to this experiment. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you 
by bank transfer at the end of the experiment.  
 
The session will be divided in two parts and you will have the opportunity to earn money in both 




In the first part of the experiment six bets will be presented to you. Each bet gives you a 50-50 
chance of winning some money or losing some money.  
 
For each bet, you must decide if you want to play it or not, although only one randomly chosen 
decision will count toward your earnings.  
 
After all participants have made their decisions for each of the six bets, the experimenter will roll 
a six-sided die. The outcome of the roll will determine the one single bet that will count to 
determine your earnings. If the die reads 1, you will be paid for your decision in the first lottery. 
If the die reads 2, you will be paid for your decision in the second lottery, and so on. Exactly one 
of the six bets will count. 
 
After the die is rolled, if you decided not to play the bet chosen by the die roll, your earnings will 
be 0 euros for this part of the experiment.  
 
If you decided to play that bet chosen by the die roll, there will be a 50-50 chance for you to win 
or lose the amount of money indicated in the bet. Then, the experimenter will toss a coin for each 
participant. If the coin comes up heads you lose and if the coin comes up tails you win the amount 
of money specified in the lottery. 
 
 
 Lottery (50-50 chance) 
  
 
           Accept to play? 
Lose 0.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 1.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 2.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 3.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 4.5€ or win 4.5€ 
o Yes o No 
Lose 5.5€ or win 4.5€ 




APPENDIX 2.II: Instructions for the Asset Market 
 
1. General Instructions 
 
The second part of the experiment consists of a sequence of trading Periods in which you will 
have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used in the market is ECU. All 
trading will be done in terms of ECU. The final payment to you at the end of the experiment will 
be in euros. The conversion rate is: 500 ECU to 1 euro. 
 
2. How to use the computerized market  
 
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current trading 
Period. The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. On the left side of 
your screen you see the number of Shares you currently have and the amount of Money you have 
available to buy Shares.  
 
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell” in the first 
column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share, and then 
select “Submit Offer To Sell”. Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and 
then click on the field labeled “Submit Offer To Sell”. You will notice that nine numbers, one 
submitted by each participant, now appear in the second column from the left, entitled “Offers To 
Sell”. Your offer is listed in blue. Submitting a second offer will replace your previous offer. 
 
The lowest offer-to-sell price will always be on the bottom of that list. You can select an offer by 
clicking on it. It will then be highlighted. If you select “Buy”, the button at the bottom of this 
column, you will buy one share for the currently selected sell price. Please purchase a share now 
by selecting an offer and clicking the “Buy” button. Since each of you had offered to sell a share 
and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you 
started out with. This is because you bought one share and sold one share. Please note that if you 
have an offer selected and the offer gets changed, it will become deselected if the offer became 




When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share 
your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may make an offer to buy a unit by selecting 
“Submit offer to buy.” Please do so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy”, 
then press the red button labeled “Submit Offer To Buy”. You can replace your offer-to-buy by 
submitting a new offer. You can accept any of the offers-to-buy by selecting the offer and then 
clicking on the “Sell” button. Please do so now.  
In the middle column, labeled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which Shares have 
been bought and sold in this period. You will now have about 5 minutes to buy and sell shares. 
This is a practice period. Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings 
and do not influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is 
to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully submitted offers to 
buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you have accepted buy and sell offers. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come by and assist you. 
 
3. Specific Instructions for this experiment 
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will be a market open for 
2 minutes, in which you may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and 
your inventory of shares carries over from one trading period to the next. You may receive 
dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.  
At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the computer will randomly determine the 
dividend value for all shares in that period. Each period, each share you hold at the end of the 
period: 
 
 earns you a dividend of 0 ECU with a ¼ chance 
 earns you a dividend of 8 ECU with a ¼ chance 
 earns you a dividend of 28 ECU with a ¼ chance 
 earns you a dividend of 60 ECU with a ¼ chance 
Each of the four dividend values is equally likely, thus the average dividend in each period is 24. 
Dividends are added to your cash balance automatically. 






4. Average Holding Value Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make decisions. There 
are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled Ending Period, indicates the last trading 
period of the experiment. The second column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during 
which the average holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of 
holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the experiment. The fourth 
column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the average amount that the dividend will be 
in each period for each unit held in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding 
Value Per Unit of Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from 
now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each share you hold for the remainder of the 
experiment, you will earn on average the amount listed in column 5.  
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend on a Share has a 25% 
chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of 
being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each Share. If you hold a 
Share for the remaining 7 periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on 
average 7*24 = 168. Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average 
168 
AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE  TABLE 
Ending Period  
 







Value per Unit of 
Inventory 
15 1 15 24 15x24=360 
15 2 14 24 14x24=336 
15 3 13 24 13x24=312 
15 4 12 24 12x24=288 
15 5 11 24 11x24=264 
15 6 10 24 10x24=240 
15 7 9 24   9x24=216 
15 8 8 24   8x24=192 
15 9 7 24   7x24=168 
15 10 6 24   6x24=144 
15 11 5 24   5x24=120 
15 12 4 24   4x24=96 
15 13 3 24   3x24=72 
15 14 2 24   2x24=48 




5. Your Earnings 
 
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will equal the amount of cash that you have at the 
end of period 15, after the last dividend has been paid. The amount of cash you will have is equal 
to:  
 
The cash (called “Money” on your screen) you have at the beginning of the experiment  
 
+ dividends you receive  
+ money received from sales of shares 


















Appendix Chapter 4:   
APPENDIX 4.I: Instructions  
Welcome to this experiment. 
 
This is an economic experiment about investment in financial products. The instructions are 
simple and if you follow them carefully you can earn a considerable amount of money. Your 
earnings are confidential and will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Your earnings will consist of two parts: your profits in the first and the second part of the 
experiment. 
 
Your personal information will be treated confidentially and will not be used for purposes 
unrelated to this experiment and your name will never be associated with any of your decisions 
when the results are published. Do not reveal your decisions to any other participant during the 
experimental session; communication with other participants in the experiment will automatically 
entail cero gain for participants who violate this rule. 
 
The experimental unit (EU) is the currency used in the experiment, so that investments, lotteries, 
etc., will be expressed in terms of EU. At the end of the experiment the amount of EU you earn 
will be converted to euros using the following exchange rate: 8.000 EU = 1 €. Keep in mind that 
the more EU you win, the more euros you will get. 
 
This economic experiment consists of three parts: 
 
1 - experimental session of 60 scenarios in which you will choose between two alternative 
investments. 
2 - lotteries session in which again you must choose under different situations. 
3 - questionnaire. 
 
1. FIRST PART OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
The main experiment consists of 60 scenarios. In each scenario, you will have to choose one 
alternative investment for an amount of 100,000 EU and a three years time horizon. 
 
In each scenario there are two possible investment alternatives: A and B. The conditions for A 
and B alternatives may vary across scenarios. 
 
Your earnings in this part of the experiment will be the outcome of the investment you've chosen 
in one of the 60 scenarios. The particular scenario will be randomly chosen casting a die after the 
experiment ends. So you should think carefully about each scenario, since the decision you make 
in one of them will determine your earnings in this part of the experiment. 
 




Alternative A is to invest in a Treasury Bond. If you choose this option, the 100,000 EU will be 
invested in risk free financial product that guarantees the safe 100% recovery of the investment, 
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and offering in addition a fixed return. The information appearing on your computer screen is for 
















The table shows the amount of EU you would get after 3 years. That is, if you invest 100,000 EU 
today, within three years you would safely get 109,000 EU. Below, the table reports how this 
result can be interpreted. So, investing 100,000 EU and obtaining 109,000 EU is equivalent to 
getting 109% of the initial investment. This percentage is composed of two elements: 100% 
recovery of initial investment plus 9% interest rate in 3 years, that is to say 3% annual yield. 
 














That is to say, if you invest 100,000 EU you would safely obtain 121,000 EU within 3 years. This 
means you get 121% of the amount you invested. This percentage is composed of two elements: 





As it has already been mentioned in each scenario you will have to choose between alternative A 
and alternative B. Just like option A, option B consists of investing the 100,000 EU amount for 
three years period, but in a guaranteed investment fund. 
 
This financial product guarantees obtaining within three years a certain percentage of the amount 




Equivalent to 109% of the 
investment: 
 
100% investment recovery + 






Equivalent to 121% of the 
investment 
 
100% investment recovery + 





index presents a positive evolution. This additional benefit is uncertain because it depends on the 
evolution of the stock market. 
 














This table shows that if you invest the 100,000 EU in the guaranteed mutual fund, within three 
years you would obtain the following: 
 
i) On one hand you obtain 97,000 EU. That is to say you will recover 97% of your investment for 
sure. 
 
ii) On the other hand, you obtain a 10% over the positive revaluation of the stock index during the 
three years. The issue, of course, is that you do not know what the future revaluation of the index 
will be. Therefore, this means that part of the final outcome of option B will always be 
probabilistic. 
 
Once you complete the 60 scenarios decisions, the computer will provide a random value for the 
revaluation of the stock index. Once this value is known, the earnings in terms of EU can be 
calculated for this part of the experiment. 
 
For this example, the following table shows the amount of EU you would obtain if you choose the 
alternative B for different possible values of the stock index revaluation (these values are only 
examples and will not necessarily occur when the random value appreciation/depreciation rate 

















Equivalent to 97% of the investment: 
 
97% recovery of the investment  
               + 
97.000 EU 
 
Equivalent to 97% of the investment: 
 
97% recovery of the investment 








in 3 years. 
i) 
 






10% over the stock index 
revaluation in 3 years 
 
Final outcome for option B: 
 
i) + ii) 
120% 97.000 EU 100.00010%120% = 12.000 
EU  
97.000 + 12.000 = 109.000 EU 
60% 97.000 EU 100.00010%60% = 6.000 
EU 
97.000 + 6.000 =  103.000 EU 
20% 97.000 EU 100.00010%20% = 2.000 
EU 
97.000 + 2.000 =  99.000 EU 
10% 97.000 EU 100.00010%10% = 1.000 
EU 
97.000 + 1.000 =  98.000 EU 
0% 97.000 EU No value* 97.000 EU 
-10% 97.000 EU No value* 97.000 EU 
-20% 97.000 EU No value* 97.000 EU 
-60% 97.000 EU No value* 97.000 EU 
* No value because the stock index revaluation was not positive 
 






























Equivalent to 103% of the investment: 
 
100% recovery of the investment + 3% 
interest rate in 3 years (1% annually) 





















60% of the stock index 
revaluation in 3 years. 
 
Final outcome for option B: 
 
i) + ii) 
 
120% 103.000 EU 100.00060%120% = 72.000 
EU 
103.000 + 72.000 = 175.000 
EU 
60% 103.000 EU 100.00060%60% = 36.000 
EU 
103.000 + 36.000 =  139.000 
EU 
20% 103.000 EU 100.00060%20% = 12.000 
EU 
103.000 +12.000 =  115.000 
EU 
10% 103.000 EU 100.00060%10% = 6.000 
EU 
103.000 + 6.000 =  109.000 
EU 
0% 103.000 EU No value* 103.000 EU 
-10% 103.000 EU No value * 103.000 EU 
-20% 103.000 EU No value * 103.000 EU 
-60% 103.000 EU No value * 103.000 EU 
* No value because the stock market revaluation was not positive 
Additional information about alternative B 
 






n in 3 
years. 
 
How to interpret the average evolution of the assets prices in the 
stock market. 
120% The assets price was multiplied by 2,2 in 3 years. (Increased a 120%) 
60% The assets price was multiplied by 1,6 in 3 years. (Increased a 60%) 
20% The assets price was multiplied by 1,2 in 3 years. (Increased a 20%) 
10% The assets price was multiplied by 1,1 in 3 years. (Increased a 10%) 
0% The assets price is the same as 3 years ago. 
-10% The assets price was multiplied by 0,9 in 3 years. (Decreased 10%) 
-20% The assets price was multiplied by 0,8 in 3 years. (Decreased 20%) 
-60% The assets price was multiplied by 0,4 in 3 years. (Decreased 60%) 
 
Stock market investments are risky investments since its future performance is uncertain. 
Therefore, as it has already been explained, the stock index revaluation after 3 years is not 
known. However it can be assumed that this performance will follow a normal distribution. This 
assumption is not far from the reality of these financial markets. Therefore, to determine the 
random value of the stock index revaluation (needed to calculate the outcome for part ii) of 
Alternative B) it is assumed that the performance of the index follows a normal distribution. So, 
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we have assumed a volatility (risk) of our stock index of 15.6% each year, which in three years is 
a risk of 15.6% × 3 = 46.8%. In practical terms it means that we can establish the following 
probability distribution for the revaluation of our stock index at 3 years: 
 




Less than -100% 0.82% 
Less than -80% 2.35% 
Less than -60% 6.18% 
Less than -40% 13.27% 
Less than -20% 24.66% 
Less than 0% 40.04% 
More than 0% 59.96% 
More than 20% 43.47% 
More than 40% 27.79% 
More than 60% 15.18% 
More than 80% 7.17% 
More than 100% 2.96% 
 
Actually, we are particularly interested in the above table to see which are the odds for the 
revaluation to be positive, since only in this case the ii) part of the alternative B offers you gains. 
 
For example, the ninth row of the mentioned 
table:   
 
is interpreted as follows: the chance that the index revaluation in three years was greater than 
60% is 15.18%. 
 
2. SECOND PART OF EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 
 
After the investment part of the experiment, some lotteries will be presented to you and you will 
have to choose again under different situations; chance and your own choices will determine your 
earnings in the second part of the experiment. 
 
3. THIRD PART OF EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 
 
Finally a questionnaire will be presented to you in order to provide your personal details and 
some issues related to the experiment. Thank you very much for your participation. 
More than 60% 15.18% 
